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I. INTRODUCTION 
It will presumably arouse no surprise among the readers of this 
volume that an examination of the growth of the Dutch population 
should be included in a discussion of the forces leading to social change 
in our country. Since the Second World War, in particular, the Dutch 
people have become aware of population problems and of the conse-
quences for our society of a population increase. There is even some 
question of a surplus-population psychosis. 
This apprehension about over-population has its roots in the baby-
boom of the early post-war years and as far as that is concerned it may 
be compared to a certain extent with similar—although far less general 
—reactions which were evoked by the rise in the birth rate after the 
First World War1). More surprising is the continuing interest in popu-
* In the original Dutch version this article was published as a contribution to 
the volume entitled "Drift en Koers" ('Trend and Direction') which appeared in 
1962 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the Nederlandse 
Sociologische Vereniging (Dutch Sociological Society). The collection as a whole 
was intended to reflect the social forces shaping contemporary Dutch society. The 
article therefore gave a fairly broad description of the population problem in the 
Netherlands and was addressed to Dutch readers interested in the social sciences 
generally and not only to those whose special interests lay in historical and soci-
ological demography. The main substance of the article, however, represents an 
entirely new approach to the problem of the decline in fertility and mortality in 
the Netherlands, based on material never previously analysed and, in fact, still 
largely unknown. For this reason it may perhaps also prove of interest to foreign 
demographers, particularly as the trend of fertility rates in the Netherlands has 
long attracted international attention on account of its exceptional character. 
No attempt has been made to adapt the article to a different category of readers 
from the original. That would have meant largely rewriting it, without really 
benefitting the new readers much. A few extra footnotes have been added, and a 
map indicating the location of the provinces, districts and municipalities mentioned 
in the text. The analysis of statistics relating to the population of the Netherlands 
during the years since 1960 has not been attempted in this new version, since the 
data in question do not throw any essentially new light on the problems discussed 
in the article. 
*) See, for example, Prof. Dr. J. H. F. KOHLBRUGGE'S preliminary report to the 
Vereniging voor Staathuishoudkunde en Statistiek (Political Economy and Sta-
tistical Society) on the question: 'How will economic developments in recent 
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lation problems so long after the end of the last war. Quite soon after 
the immediate post-war years, the Dutch birth rate dropped to a level 
not so very different from that prevailing before the war. Although 
there are fluctuations from year to year, a tendency towards a gradual 
further decline can be observed. Moreover, the birth rate in the 
Netherlands now is less at variance with the rates in other more or less 
comparable countries than it was before the war (see table 1). 
Table 1 
Average Crude birth-rates in the periods 1938-1939 and 1957-1958 in a number of 
Western European countries, and in the U.S.A. and Canada 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
U.S.A. 
Canada 
1938-1939 
15.8 
18.0 
21.1 
14.6 
25.6 
19.2 
23.7 
15.0 
20.6 
15.8 
26.4 . 
15.2 
15.2 
15.4 
17.4 
20.5 
1957-1958 
17.0 
16.7 
19.3 
18.4 
19.2 
21.0 
18.0 
15.6 
21.2 
18.0 
23.7 
14.4 
17.6 
16.6 
24.6 
28.0 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook 1948; Demographic Yearbook 1959 
In general, a certain tendency towards a levelling of national birth 
rates can be observed in Europe to the west of the Iron Curtain, and 
in North America. To a large extent, the countries with crude birth 
rates above 20 per 1,000 before the war have seen their birth rates fall, 
and the countries where these rates were formerly below 20 per 1,000 
now lie much higher on the scale. In these circumstances the Nether-
lands is no longer such an exception. The opinion which one can still 
hear so often expressed, namely that the Netherlands is the country 
'with the highest birth rate in the western world' is an obselete stereo-
type: for years now, birth rates in the United States of America and 
years affect population figures, particularly in the Netherlands', 1922; mr. J. 
BIERENS DE HAAN jr., Het fatum van bevolkingsvermeerdering (The fate of Population 
Increase), 1924. 
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in Canada have been higher than in the Netherlands. Another very-
striking fact is that, as regards the welfare of the population, the 
Netherlands has perhaps never before, in some 150 years, experienced 
so little inconvenience from an increase in the number of its inhabitants 
as in precisely this period after the Second World War, a period almost 
continually characterized by rapid economic expansion and full em-
ployment. The great interest manifested in overseas migration after 
the war, particularly on the part of the authorities, cannot therefore 
be easily explained on the grounds of demographic-economic con-
siderations1). 
The foregoing, of course, does not mean to say that this interest in 
the population problem is undesirable. One may be permitted to 
wonder, indeed, whether, compared with the attention the subject 
attracted before the Second World War and the interest currently 
displayed in other major problems of the day, the interest now taken 
is not disproportionately great. Undoubtedly, however, taken on its 
own merits, the problem of population expansion in the Netherlands 
continues to be extraordinarily absorbing from a scientific point of 
view and highly significant from a social one. 
A sociological study of the Dutch population problem in the frame-
work of this symposium implies an attempt at answering two ques-
tions. In the first place, it must be ascertained what social forces are 
currently operative in the pattern of our population's development 
and how they affect actual population growth. In the second place, an 
attempt will have to be made to find out how the population increase 
affects other sectors of social activity. 
In the following study, migration will be left out of consideration. 
Although the influence of overseas migration upon the population 
size of the Netherlands in the period following the Second World 
War cannot be denied, it yet remains of secondary and, moreover, 
diminishing importance with regard to population development as a 
whole. Besides, adequate discussion of the problem of international 
migration would involve disproportionate expansion of the present 
article. 
In the following pages, therefore, we shall deal successively with 
trends in fertility, mortality, and the effect of population increase. 
l) See E. W. HOFSTEE, 'Netherlands', Economics oj'International Migration, edited 
by Brinley Thomas, London 1958, pp 96-106. 
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Table 2 
Crude birth-rates in the Netherlands, 1850-1959 {five-yearly averages) 
Period 
1851-1855 
1856-1860 
1861-1865 
1866-1870 
1871-1875 
1876-1880 
1881-1885 
1886-1890 
1891-1895 
1896-1900 
1901-1905 
Average birth-rate 
33,7 
33,3 
35,1 
35,1 
35,9 
36,4 
34,8 
33,8 
32,9 
32,2 
31,5 
Period 
1906-1910 
1911-1915 
1916-1920 
1921-1925 
1926-1930 
1931-1935 
1936-1940 
1941-1945 
1946-1950 
1951-1955 
1956-1959 
Average birth-rate 
29,6 
27,6 
26,2 
25,7 
23,2 
21,2 
20,4 
22,2 
26,0 
21,9 
21,2 
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics and Dept. of Rural Sociology, Agricultural 
University 
After a continuous decline from 1875 on (punctuated only by a 
short period with higher figures after the First World War and a 
longer period with higher birth rates just before, during and after the 
Second World War), in the period 1956-1959 the birth rate reached 
a level slightly above that of the last five-year period before the last 
war and, by chance, precisely the same as that of the first five-year 
period in the thirties. 
Now, of course, crude birth rates alone are only of limited value 
as an indication of fertility trends. Graph 1 illustrates the development 
of the birth rate and its three demographic components (see also: 
tables 4, 5 and 6), namely, the relative number of females between 15 
and 44 years of age in the total population, the relative number of 
married females between 15 and 44 years of age in the total number 
of females in that age group, and the number of births per 1,000 
married females aged between 15 an 44 (marital fertility). 
As regards the most recent period, it appears that marital fertility in 
the period 1956-1959 was at approximately the same level as in the 
period 1936-1940, or even a little lower. The fact that the crude birth 
rate in the period 1956-1959 is a little higher than in this low period 
before the war must be attributed to the considerably higher percentage 
of married females. This compensated not only for the slightly lower 
marital fertility but also for the fall in the percentage of the total 
number of females between 15 and 44 years of age in the total popu-
lation. Bearing in mind that in consequence of the increased nuptiality 
the percentage of young married persons in the most recent period 
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Graph 1 
percentage of females aged 15-44 in total population 
percentage of married females aged 15-44 in total number of females aged 
15-44 
number of births per 1,000 married females aged between 15 and 44 
(martial fertility) 
birth rate 
was considerably higher than in the years just before the war, and that 
the marital fertility of young married persons is considerably higher 
than of those who have been married longer (see table 3, page 49), it 
is clear that, expectations concerning the size of family of the present 
generation of married persons must be lower than ever before, com-
pared with former generations. 
Taking the present level of the demographic factors affecting fer-
tility as a whole, we arrive at the following conclusions: 
1. The Netherlands now displays a marital fertility which, com-
pared with the totality of the western world, is indeed relatively high 
but by no means exceptional and which, showing a definite tendency 
to decline, has now fallen to the lowest known level in Dutch demo-
graphic history. 
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Table 3 
Marriages according to age of contracting parties, 1953-1959 
Per 1,000 single persons in each age group 
Total 
Year 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50 years 20-49 
and older years 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
Males 
2,9 
3,0 
3,2 
3,2 
3,5 
3,9 
4,0 
64,3 
67,6 
70,8 
75,0 
80,1 
83,7 
83,7 
204,8 
218,4 
223,0 
235,6 
240,8 
237,9 
230,4 
179,7 
181,2 
184,9 
188,6 
176,2 
180,9 
166,5 
103,5 
103,2 
100,2 
104,6 
102,3 
96,3 
88,0 
63,7 
66,7 
63,6 
64,5 
65,0 
57,1 
55,7 
30,3 
49,0 
48,8 
49,9 
43,5 
42,5 
41,7 
15,4 
15,4 
15,7 
15,6 
16,4 
14,8 
14,3 
112,5 
117,3 
119,7 
125,6 
127,4 
127,0 
122,6 
Females 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
18,7 
19,4 
19,9 
20,3 
21,7 
22,7 
23,1 
139,7 
149,3 
156,0 
167,1 
179,2 
184,8 
180,4 
207,0 
221,2 
230,2 
249,7 
253,3 
247,1 
237,2 
112,3 
108,4 
110,2 
112,5 
113,2 
105,9 
100,4 
53,2 
53,4 
53,3 
53,5 
53,3 
50,5 
47,4 
31,0 
31,3 
30,2 
31,7 
30,9 
28,1 
28,4 
21,3 
21,1 
21,7 
20,8 
21,1 
19,4 
19,0 
4,3 
4,5 
4,5 
4,6 
4,8 
4,3 
4,1 
120,1 
126,1 
130,3 
138,5 
143,2 
142,6 
138,1 
Source: C.B.S. 
2. Since the last world war, very much higher nuptiality combined 
with a lowering of age at marriage can be observed. 
3. Developments in the age structure of the Dutch population have 
resulted in the number of females aged between 15 and 44 in the 
total population being at a relatively low level at present. 
What, now, is the social background to the present situation? How 
is it connected with social developments in the recent past and ac-
cordingly with the attitude of the Dutch population towards marriage 
and reproduction? What does all this suggest about the future? 
Demographic-sociological research in the Netherlands has clearly 
demonstrated that a region-by-region approach is practically indis-
pensable for a full insight into this country's fertility problem, not 
only because there are such important regional differences in fertility 
but, above all, because a regional approach can help considerably in 
providing an insight into the factors determining trends in the country 
as a whole. 
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The figures for each province in tables 4, 5 and 6 give a general idea 
of regional trends in respect of the three components of the birth rate. 
The number of females aged between 15 and 45 as a percentage of 
the total population is, of course, the result of the complicated inter-
play of all the long-term population changes. Two factors, however, 
are of particular importance in accounting for the developments in the 
country as a whole as well as for the regional variations, namely the 
trend of the birth rate and of migration. Other things being equal, a 
rise in the birth rate will lead, in the first instance, to a reduction in the 
percentage of 15-44 year-old females because young people under 15 
years of age will form a larger fraction of the total population. When, 
in the course of time, the increase in births begins to make itself felt 
in the age group of the over-fifteens, this effect will gradually disap-
pear. A fall in the birth rate naturally has the reverse effect. In the area 
concerned, emigration surpluses lead to a relatively sharp decline in 
the group of young economically active persons, i.e. the 15-45 year-
olds. 
The upward trend of the birth rate which asserted itself throughout 
the whole country after 1850 led, in the first instance, to a reduction 
in the percentage of 15-44 year-old females. When, about 1880, the 
fertility increase made itself felt in the age groups over 15 years of age 
and simultaneously a decline in the birth rate set in, the percentage 
rose again, even though the effect of the falling birth rate was di-
minished by the reduction in the number of deaths of young persons, 
especially infants. The rise continued gradually until the latter half of 
the thirties when, in consequence of the recovering birth rate, a slight 
decline set in. The decline accelerated during and after the war so that 
in the period 1956-1959 the very low percentage of 20.5 was reached. 
A reversal of the trend may be expected very shortly, now that those 
born in the immediate post-war years are about to pass the 15-year 
mark while the birth rate, generally speaking, is still showing a tenden-
cy to decline. 
As regards the ratios between the various provinces, in the areas 
with a persistent emigration surplus—Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe 
and Zeeland—the factors just mentioned give rise to a relatively low 
percentage of females aged between 15 and 44, and in the areas with 
an immigration surplus, especially the provinces of North and South 
Holland, they occasion a relatively high percentage of females in this 
age group. In consequence, the crude birth rate statistics for North 
and South Holland give a somewhat exaggerated idea of the desire for 
Table 4 
Number of married females aged 15-44 as percentage of total population, 1850-1959 
18511856 18611866 18711876 18811886 1891 1896 19011906 19111916 1921 1926 19311936 19411946 1951 1956 
'55 '60 '65 '70 '75 '80 '85 .90 '95 '00 '05 '10 '15 '20 '25 '30 '35 '40 '45 '50 '55 '59 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
Overijssel 
Gelderland 
Utrecht 
N.-Holland 
S.-Holland 
Zeeland 
N.-Brabant 
Limburg 
Netherlands 
23.3 22.2 
22.9 23.1 
22.8 22.5 
22.7 22.8 
22.1 22.4 
23.4 23.5 
24.7 24.7 
24.0 24.1 
23.2 23.6 
22.9 23.1 
21.6 21.6 
23.4 23.4 
23.0 22.5 
22.9 22.4 
22.1 21.5 
22.5 22.0 
22.1 21.6 
23.3 22.8 
24.5 23.9 
23.9 23.4 
23.4 22.5 
22.8 22.3 
21.4 21.0 
23.1 22.6 
22.1 21.7 
21.9 21.4 
21.0 20.6 
21.5 21.1 
21.2 20.8 
22.3 21.8 
23.4 23.0 
22.9 22.4 
21.7 21.2 
21.6 21.1 
20.7 20.5 
22.1 21.6 
21.4 21.4 21.5 
21.2 21.2 21.3 
20.4 20.2 19.9 
20.9 20.9 21.0 
20.6 20.6 20.8 
21.4 21.2 21.3 
22.8 22.8 23.0 
22.1 22.0 22.2 
20.9 21.0 21.2 
20.8 20.8 21.0 
20.3 20.3 20.5 
21.4 21.4 21.6 
21.7 21.8 
21.4 21.5 
19.5 19.7 
21.2 21.3 
21.2 21.3 
21.7 22.1 
23.3 23.6 
22.6 22.9 
21.5 21.8 
21.4 21.5 
20.9 21.0 
21.9 22.2 
21.8 22.0 
21.6 21.6 
20.1 20.5 
21.5 21.8 
21.4 21.5 
22.5 22.8 
24.0 24.3 
23.1 23.4 
22.0 22.2 
21.4 21.4 
21.0 21.1 
22.4 22.6 
22.2 
21.7 
20.8 
22.2 
21.7 
23.1 
24.5 
23.7 
22.4 
21.5 
21.4 
22.8 
22.4 22.6 
21.7 21.7 
20.9 20.8 
22.6 22.9 
22.0 22.2 
23.4 23.6 
24.6 24.7 
24.0 24.3 
22.4 22.4 
21.6 21.6 
21.7 22.0 
23.0 23.2 
22.5 22.5 
21.6 21.4 
20.9 21.2 
22.9 22.6 
22.3 22.2 
24.0 22.2 
24.5 24.0 
24.3 24.0 
22.3 22.0 
21.2 22.0 
22.1 22.3 
23.2 23.1 
22.5 22.1 
21.2 21.8 
21.5 21.5 
22.6 22.1 
22.2 22.0 
23.1 22.6 
23.6 23.0 
23.6 23.0 
21.8 21.3 
22.2 22.1 
22.4 22.3 
22.9 22.4 
20.9 20.0 
20.2 19.1 
20.8 20.3 
22.1 20.3 
22.0 20.4 
22.3 20.6 
22.6 20.7 
21.6 20.7 
21.0 19.3 
21.4 21.0 
21.7 21.3 
21.3 20.5 
o 
o 
% 
M % 
o 
Table 5 
Number of married females aged 15-44 as percentage of total number of females aged 15-44, 1850-1959 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
Overijssel 
Gelderland 
Utrecht 
N.-Holland 
S.-Holland 
Zeeland 
N.-Brabant 
Limburg 
Netherlands 
18511856 18611866 1871 
'55 '60 '65 '70 
41.4 42.1 43.1 44.3 
43.8 44.4 45.4 46.7 
42.2 44.1 46.0 47.7 
41.6 42.3 43.5 44.9 
38.9 40.0 41.2 42.5 
37.6 38.8 40.3 41.9 
41.5 42.3 43.3 44.5 
41.4 42.9 44.2 45.4 
42.5 43.4 44.3 45.8 
33.4 33.5 34.7 36.9 
38.5 38.5 39.1 40.1 
39.8 40.8 42.1 43.5 
'75 
45.8 
48.3 
48.9 
46.1 
43.5 
43.2 
46.0 
46.8 
47.0 
38.9 
40.7 
44.9 
1876 1881 
'80 
47.3 
49.8 
49.5 
46.9 
44.2 
44.1 
47.4 
47.9 
47.2 
40.3 
40.9 
46.0 
'85 
47.0 
49.3 
49.6 
47.2 
44.0 
44.3 
47.4 
47.6 
46.7 
40.1 
40.1 
45.8 
1886 
'90 
45.7 
47.6 
49.4 
47.1 
43.3 
44.0 
46.6 
46.5 
45.5 
38.8 
38.9 
44.9 
18911896 1901 
'95 '00 
45.4 45.9 
47.3 48.0 
50.0 51.2 
47.3 47.7 
43.0 43.2 
43.9 43.8 
46.1 45.9 
45.5 44.9 
45.3 46.0 
38.4 38.8 
38.4 38.6 
44.5 44.7 
'05 
47.1 
49.1 
52.2 
48.3 
43.8 
43.8 
46.2 
45.4 
46.8 
39.9 
40.0 
45.3 
1906 19111916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 
'10 
48.2 
50.3 
53.0 
48.8 
44.3 
43.9 
46.8 
46.4 
47.5 
41.4 
42.0 
46.2 
'15 
47.2 
51.0 
53.6 
48.6 
45.2 
44.5 
47.7 
47.0 
48.1 
42.3 
43.9 
46.9 
'20 
48.1 
51.2 
54.0 
48.0 
45.5 
45.2 
48.7 
47.5 
48.5 
42.8 
45.6 
47.4 
'25 
50.7 
51.6 
54.5 
48.3 
46.2 
46.1 
49.7 
48.1 
49.2 
43.7 
47.0 
48.1 
'30 
51.5 
52.3 
55.1 
49.2 
47.1 
47.0 
50.6 
49.0 
50.4 
44.8 
48.3 
49.0 
'35 
53.2 
53.2 
55.9 
50.3 
48.5 
48.6 
51.7 
50.4 
51.9 
47.0 
49.1 
50.0 
'40 '45 
54.7 56.4 
54.4 55.5 
56.8 57.5 
51.8 52.7 
50.2 51.8 
52.4 51.5 
53.1 54.4 
52.2 53.9 
53.8 55.7 
46.9 47.8 
49.4 49.7 
51.1 52.1 
1946 19511956 
'50 '56 '59 
58.3 60.9 64.2 
56.9 59.4 60.1 
58.7 61.4 66.6 
54.0 56.1 56.5 
53.5 55.8 57.7 
53.0 55.0 58.9 
55.8 57.8 59.7 
55.8 58.2 60.9 
57.9 61.0 65.7 
49.0 51.5 53.7 
50.9 54.8 58.4 
53.8 56.6 59.7 
w 
H 
w 
en bo 
Table 6 
Number of birth per 1,000 married females aged 15-44 (marital fertility), 1850-1959 
1851 1856 1861 1866 1871 1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 
'55 '60 '65 '70 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 1900 '05 '10 '15 '20 '25 '30 '35 '40 '45 '50 '55 '59 
Groningen 335.7 327.0 341.7 341.5 339.0 348.3 323.0 320.9 317.1 308.5 296.7 276.2 256.3 237.7 222.7 188.6 165.3 154.5 165.9 184.9 155.4146.1 P 
Friesland 320.1304.5 326.3 329.6 325.6 323.2 292.0 294.6 286.8 272.3 265.9 239.7 222.2 219.7 217.6 199.4181.1176.7196.9 209.6 189.5 185.9 4 
Dieathe 318.5 330.7 327.1 321.6 321.1 331.4 315.0 325.2 332.0 326.2 326.0 309.4 289.5 290.7 283.1 237.0 208.6 185.8 194.8 213.0 192.6 163.8 " 
Overijssel 336.1 329.9 333.8 335.9 330.4 335.5 324.3 330.9 328.6 324.5 314.2 287.5 261.1246.6 240.6 216.9192.0 177.9 192.5 216.8 195.7195.2 § 
Gelderland 354.0 352.8 359.4 355.2 347.1 357.8 353.0 355.2 349.8 346.4 332.7 310.8 283.9 265.9 259.0 230.3 205.6 186.8199.8 226.9 197.1185.4 8 
Utrecht 390.0 378.0 389.9 377.5 374.3 384.4 382.1383.3 369.7 352.4 333.1296.0 265.7 244.8 237.2 202.4180.9 172.4185.9 218.3184.4171.1 g 
N.-Holland 359.4 329.1 353.1 337.3 337.2 345.8 346.0 332.4 311.5 285.3 265.2 233.1209.0 195.7 178.8 158.4142.4141.2 150.9 189.1155.5 152.3 w 
S.-Holland 397.4 379.0 392.1 383.3 384.6 384.0 380.2 369.2 353.6 336.9 317.2 286.6 256.5 226.7 209.4180.4158.8151.2152.3 196.5 160.3 153.1 
Zeeland 392.1 379.3 401.8 392.4 408.4 385.3 356.9 361.5 355.0 335.5 309.7 274.3 243.7 227.8 207.4176.4156.6 151.4162.2182.9 165.6 154.3 
N.-Brabant 351.9 361.5 378.2 386.6 389.2 395.8 392.7 398.1 396.2 399.8 404.4 377.1 352.2 332.7 331.6 297.8 269.1 243.4 255.0 268.5 230.4 212.8 
Limbutg 361.3 367.5 369.7 376.2 379.3 390.7 384.3 386.9 395.0 400.5 398.9 378.1 350.2 319.0 310.2 273.9 243.3 218.1 230.0 245.2 217.3 193.5 
Netherlands 356.4 346.6 359.5 356.0 355.3 359.1 354.4 351.4 341.3 328.3 315.1 287.5 261.5 242.9 231.9 204.2183.1173.5 184.9 215.1181.3 172.1 
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children, while the reverse is true of the areas of emigration, particu-
larly after about 1875 as the scale of the movement increased. 
For a long time, North Brabant and Limburg also showed a rela-
tively low percentage of 15-44 year-old females because the decline in 
the birth rate set in comparatively late in these provinces. They there-
fore had a certain reserve of "reproductive power". At the present 
time, however, they are busy using up this reserve. The relatively 
slight influence of the baby-boom after the Second World War in the 
southern provinces and the relatively rapid decrease in the birth rate 
in these provinces in recent decades, in general, have resulted in a 
situation where, for the first time since 1850, during the period 1950-
1955 the percentage of 15-44 year-old females is higher in North 
Brabant and Limburg than in the country as a whole. The gradual 
decline in the emigration rate from the south to other provinces has 
undoubtedly helped to further this development. 
Although from a demographic point of view the percentage trend 
of 15-44 year-old females is a significant element in fertility trends, it 
is, in itself, not particularly interesting sociologically. It is, so to speak, 
mechanically determined by other demographic factors even though 
these have their own background in the evolving social situation. 
It is clear that social factors are particularly active in respect of the 
next component, namely the number of married females as a per-
centage of the total number of females of 15-44 years of age. We do 
not want to go too deeply into these backgrounds here and shall 
confine ourselves, for the most part, to a brief survey of actual de-
velopments. Throughout the last century the percentage for the 
country as a whole shows an almost continual real increase, interrupted 
only by a decline after 1880, which must be attributed, in the first 
place, to the great agricultural crisis at the end of the last century1). 
Until the Second World War this increase was very gradual in charac-
ter. In 80 years the percentage rose from approximately 40 to ap-
proximately 51, i.e. about 0.14% per annum. After the war, however, 
a big change set in. In 10 years' time it increased by about 6, i.e. by 
0.6% per annum. In this respect, we may speak of an almost revo-
lutionary change in the demographic position of the Netherlands, a 
change which is bound to have farreaching social consequences. It is 
x) E. W. HOFSTEE, 'Regionale verscheidenheid in de ontwikkeling van het aan-
tal geboorten in Nederland in de 2e helft van de 19de eeuw' (Regional Diversity 
in Fertility Trends in the Netherlands in the Second Half of the 19th Century), 
Akademiedagen, Volume VII, 1954, p. 98 etc. 
54 E. W. HOFSTEE 
most remarkable that—even after this last great change—the differ-
ences between the various provinces as regards the percentage of 
married females among the 15-44 year-olds are still of practically the 
same nature as fully a century ago. In the period 1851-1855, the 
provinces of Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe and Zeeland especially 
but also North and South Holland, had relatively high percentages, 
whereas the provinces of Limburg, Utrecht and Gelderland,—and 
North Brabant in particular—showed figures that were lower than the 
national average. The situation in the period 1955-1959 might be 
summed up in almost the same words. Only Overyssel, which was a 
little above the national average in the period 1851-1855, and remained 
so up to the period 1950-1955, has just dropped below the national 
level in the most recent period of all. Because of the rise in the total 
level, of course, the relative importance of the differences between the 
provinces in the percentage of married women is less now than a 
century ago. 
However much the birth rate trend may be affected by the number 
of females married out of all those aged 15-44 (other things being 
equal, the increase in the percentage of married women between the 
periods 1930-1935 and 1956-1959 would have meant an increase of 
almost 20% in the national birth rate) even more important from the 
point of view of overall fertility is the marital fertility trend, at least 
within the last 75 years. 
It is true that there were already differences in the marital fertility 
of the various provinces in the middle of the last century but, as I have 
demonstrated elsewhere1), the important variations in the crude birth 
rate figures of the various provinces in the period 1851-1855 must be 
attributed primarily to the differences in the percentage of married 
females among females aged 15-45. In those days, there was still no 
question of relatively high fertility rates in the mainly Roman Catholic 
provinces of North Brabant and Limburg. Figures for the western 
provinces were then higher than those for the southern provinces. 
Generally speaking, right up to about 1875 there was still nothing 
remarkable about the regional trends of fertility rates. At that time, 
the figures for Friesland and Groningen were a little higher than in the 
period 1851-1855, while the eastern part of the country, and Utrecht, 
lay at approximately the same level as in the middle of the century. 
As for the west, while it is true that North and South Holland showed 
a slight fall,in the period 1871-1875 Zeeland produced the highest 
x) E. W. HOFSTEE, 'Regionale vetscheidenheid . . . etc.' 
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marital fertility rate ever recorded in one province in any five-year 
period since 1850. Like Limburg, North Brabant showed a consider-
able rise but, compared with South Holland and Zeeland, for ex-
ample, the rate in neither province was remarkably high. 
After 1880, however, the situation changes. Marital fertility rates in 
the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, North and South Holland and 
Zeeland start to fall quite rapidly and continue to do so without a 
break during the following decades. In Drenthe, Overyssel, Gelder-
land and Utrecht, the fall begins later and is less pronounced. In North 
Brabant and Limburg there is actually a rise after 1880, so that in 
these provinces around the turn of the century the highest level of 
marital fertility since 1850—over 400—is reached. In the period 1921-
1925, marital fertility rates in the two northern and three western 
provinces are obviously lower than in the rest of the country. They 
are all under the national average, whilst the others are above, al-
though, as far as Utrecht is concerned, the difference is very slight 
indeed. In North Brabant and Limburg, in particular, they are con-
siderably higher than in the country as a whole in the period 1900-
1930. Apart from some fluctuations, the rate in North Brabant con-
tinues about 90 to 100 points above the national average during this 
whole period. 
Not long after that, the tide begins to turn. Partly in the twenties 
but mainly in the thirties, marital fertility rates are seen to be falling 
more slowly in the west and north of the country, including Utrecht 
but not Groningen, whereas in the remaining provinces the rate of fall 
remains the same or is even accelerated. 
Compared with 1931-1935, the marital fertility rate fell less between 
1936 and 1940 in all the western provinces just mentioned than in the 
country as a whole. The decline in the provinces of North Brabant 
and Limburg was particularly great. Broadly speaking, this tendency, 
which started in the thirties, has been continuing ever since. When, in 
the period 1951-1955, the very abnormal character of early post-war 
natality had become less marked and the marital fertility rate for the 
country as a whole had again reached the approximate level of 1931-
1935, the figures in the provinces of Friesland, North Holland, 
Utrecht, South Holland and Zeeland turned out to be considerably 
higher than in the period 1931-1935. In North Brabant and Limburg, 
however, they were noticeably very much lower. The eastern part of 
the country, too, registered a pretty general fall. Only in Overyssel 
could a slight rise be recorded. 
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The period 1955-1959 presents virtually the same picture. In general, 
this period shows a distinct decline compared with the previous one, 
but the fall is by no means uniform in every province. In Friesland, 
Utrecht, North Holland, South Holland and Zeeland, it is slight. In 
Groningen and Overyssel it is also less than in the country as a whole, 
but Drenthe and Gelderland show a relatively sharp decrease. Viewed 
over the entire period, Drenthe falls below the level of Friesland and, 
taking each year separately, it turns out that in 1959 Gelderland, too, 
is lower than Friesland. Once more, however, the decline in marital 
fertility in North Brabant and Limburg is particularly striking. In this 
period, the level in Limburg is lower than that in Overyssel and it no 
longer differs essentially from Friesland. In North Brabant it continues 
to be a little higher than in Limburg, but the differences with various 
other provinces have gradually become comparatively small. At the 
beginning of the present century, North Brabant lay about 140 points 
ahead of Friesland and North Holland. The difference with Friesland 
now is still about 30 points, with North Holland about 60. The differ-
ence with the country as a whole has been reduced to about 40 points. 
We must therefore conclude that the idea—still popular in the Nether-
lands—that, in proportion, the two southern provinces are character-
ized by exceptionally high fertility has been losing authenticity for 
some decades already and at the present moment can hardly be re-
garded as being in accordance with the facts. 
Thus marital fertility differentiation between the various Dutch 
provinces in the course of more than a century follows a curious cycle. 
Starting with a situation in which differences certainly existed but, 
broadly speaking, not of a kind which could be considered of decisive 
importance for the level of fertility and proceeding via conditions 
under which great differences in marital fertility primarily determined 
fertility level differentiation, we have returned to a point where these 
differences are once more relatively insignificant. 
Although the provincial statistics clearly indicate the emergence of 
various interesting and important questions concerning the causes of 
the differences in regional fertility trends in the Netherlands and of 
other regional differences of a demographic nature connected with 
this, classification according to provinces is too rough-and-ready to 
provide an adequate basis for the formulation of any interpretative 
hypotheses. More precise regional classification, which really means 
classification by municipalities, is necessary. Unfortunately the data 
we have about the past do not admit of calculating marital fertility and 
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the other demographic components of the birth rate separately for 
each municipality over a long period, so that we must make do with 
the complex, and therefore somewhat more unwieldy, data on the 
crude birth rate itself. 
A series of four maps (2, 3, 4 and 5), each covering developments 
over a quarter of a century (with the exception of the map for the 
period between 1901-1905 and 1931-1935) illustrates the rise or fall of 
the birth rate, per municipality, from 1850 to 1959. This series of maps 
presents a particularly interesting and remarkable picture. In the 
period between 1851-1855 and 1876-1880, regional differences in the 
development of the birth rate are still not clearly defined. It is only in 
the peninsula of North Holland and in some parts of Zeeland that a 
certain decline can be recorded, while North Brabant registers the 
sharpest rise. In general, as the figures for the whole country also 
show, a moderate rise is evident, even though there is still some 
divergence between the various municipalities. Part of this divergence 
should perhaps be attributed to coincidence; at any rate it cannot be 
accounted for without very detailed study. 
The subsequent 25-year period, however, shows quite a different 
trend of affairs. In map 3 there is quite a clear-cut division between 
areas with a sharp decline in the birth rate and those with a slight 
decline or rise. Zeeland, South Holland, the west of Utrecht, North 
Holland, western Friesland, northern Groningen and the western tip 
of Overyssel are areas with a sharp fall. The remainder show a slight 
fall or rise, although some municipalities of course, strike a different 
note. 
It is remarkable that the dividing line between sharp decline and 
slight decline or rise during this period is practically conterminous 
with the boundary between the alluvial and the diluvial part of the 
Netherlands. An exception is formed by the eastern part of the river-
clay area, which teams up with the diluvial part. 
But the next map (4), for the period between 1901-1905 and 1931-
1935 shows that not too much value should be attributed to this di-
vision between alluvial and diluvial in itself. It turns out that the 
boundary between sharp decline and slight decline or rise has shifted, 
without changing its orientation, to the southeast. The only places in 
the east of the country which still form part of the area with a slight 
fall or rise are then the east of Brabant, Limburg, the "Land van Maas 
en Waal", the "Rijk van Nijmegen", part of the "Gelderse Achter-
hoek", the "Lijmers" district, and a few municipalities in eastern 
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"Twente". It is noticeable, however, that during this period in the 
west and north of the country a few of the areas in which the sharp 
decline first manifested itself now show a definite slowing-down in 
the rate of fall, and here and there a rise actually sets in again. This 
applies to the peninsula of North Holland and the western part of 
the province of Friesland, while signs of a similar trend can also be 
observed in North Groningen. 
Finally, then, the map of the most recent period (5). This one clearly 
shows that the symptoms of a reversal of the tendency, which were 
apparent in the foregoing period, were indeed the precursors of a 
conspicious change in the general trend of the birth rate. This last 
map is almost the exact opposite1 of the map covering the period be-
tween 1876-1880 and 1901-1905 (map 3). Zeeland, South Holland, 
Utrecht, North Holland, the west of Friesland and North Groningen 
are the areas where, between 1931-1935 and 1956-1959, birth rates in 
general either rise or remain unchanged. The western part of Over-
ijssel, too, falls into line again with the west of the country, registering 
a relatively sharp rise in the birth rate. The areas with a sharp decline 
in the birth rate, on the other hand, are to be found, in the first place, 
in Brabant, particularly in the east, then in Limburg, the "Land van 
Maas en Waal", the "Rijk van Nijmegen", a number of municipalities 
in the "Achterhoek", the "Lijmers" district and "Twente", eastern 
Drenthe, and in southwest and southeast Groningen. Although the 
comparison of the maps for the periods between 1876-1880 and 1901-
1905 and between 1931-1935 and 1956-1959 naturally does not hold 
good in every respect, the concurrence in a negative sense—often so 
striking in details, too—is so great that the hypothesis of a definite 
connection cannot fail to be made. 
It is another question where this connection should be sought, i.e. 
how this remarkable phenomenon of the shift in the decline of natality 
across the country from northwest to southeast should be explained. 
Allow me to refer here to an earlier study on fertility trends in the 
Netherlands since the middle of the last century, a study which deals 
particularly with developments in the second half of the 19th century 
and to which the present contribution is therefore, in its way, a sequel2. 
In the article in question, the trend of regional differences in fertility 
in the 19th century is attributed to the interplay of three different 
x) Note that, as the keys indicate, the scale intervals on map 4 are half the size 
of those on maps 1, 2 and 3. 
2) E. W. HOFSTEE, 'Regionale verscheidenheid . . . e tc ' 
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Map 2 
Comparison of the average number of births per 1,000 of the total population in 
Dutch municipalities during the periods 1851-1855 and 1876-1880. 
Source: C.B.S. 
1851-1855 = 33.7 
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Map 3 
Comparison of the average number of births per 1,000 of the total population in 
Dutch municipalities during the periods 1876-1880 and 1901-1905. 
Source: C.B.S. 
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1876-1880 = 36.3 
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Comparison of the average number of births per 1,000 of the total population in 
Dutch municipalities during the periods 1901-1905 and 1932-1935. 
Source: C.B.S. 
Netherlands 
1901-1905 = 31.8 
1931-1935 = 21.2 
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Comparison of the average number of births per 1,000 of the total population in 
Dutch municipalities during the periods 1931-1935 and 1956-1959. 
Source: C.B.S. 
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patterns of marriage and reproduction varying in significance ac-
cording to time and place. These patterns are referred to as the a-
grarian-artisan pattern, the pattern of the so-called proletarian inter-
mediate stage, and the pattern of modern birth control. 
The agrarian-artisan pattern is characterized by an adjustment of 
population growth to the available means of subsistence, achieved by 
marrying late or not at all. People only enter into marriage when they 
are certain of having found a firm basis of livelihood, as a rule as an 
independent farmer, craftsman or shopkeeper. In this pattern, limi-
tation of the number of children per marriage plays either no part at 
all or only a minor one. 
The pattern of the proletarian intermediate stage comes into being 
with the rise of an industrial and agricultural labourers' proletariat in 
the 19th century. A fundamental characteristic of the position of a 
member of this group in the 19th century was social insecurity. In 
principle, therefore, there was no point in delaying marriage until 
there was a secured means of livelihood. And, in fact, compared with 
the agrarian-artisan pattern, the pattern of the proletarian intermediate 
stage is characterized by earlier and more frequent marriage. One thing 
it had in common with the agrarian-artisan pattern, however, was the 
absence, or near-absence, of deliberate birth control in marriage, so 
that the development of this pattern led to a rise in the birth rate. 
The pattern of modern birth control needs no further definition. It 
first develops in the higher strata of the community where, with a 
falling mortality rate, the threat represented by many children to the 
property position and social status of the family was earliest and most 
deeply felt, and where the intellectual predisposition to deliberate 
intervention in the reproductive process was first present. More about 
this last point later. 
Around 1850, fertility in the Netherlands was still largely dominated 
by the agrarian-artisan pattern ofreproduction although here and there 
perhaps, it is already possible to detect something of the influence 
exerted on the birth rate by the growth of the proletariat. As I have 
tried to show in the article in question, between 1850 and 1875 the 
development of the pattern of the proletarian intermediate stage can 
already be clearly observed in various parts of the country, and the 
birth rate increase in the country as a whole during this period must 
be mainly attributed to it. To be sure, the increase was noticeably 
checked, on the one hand because large sections of the population in 
various parts of the country clung to the traditional agrarian-artisan 
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reproductive pattern, and on the other—as has already been said— 
because in the west of the country, particularly in the peninsula of 
North Holland and in some parts of Zeeland, the first signs of the 
development of the pattern of modern birth control were already 
visible. 
The modern reproductive pattern only becomes a predominating 
influence in the national birth rate trend after the eighteen-nineties. 
Admittedly the birth rate had already begun to fall before then but, 
as mentioned earlier, a temporary decline in the percentage of married 
women is clearly noticeable after 1875 as a result of the economic 
crisis which then asserted itself and, as appears from tables 4, 5 and 6 
and from graph 1, this decline was primarily responsible for the fall 
in the birth rate between 1875 and 1885. 
The fact that modern birth control started to govern the national 
birth rate after 1890 naturally does not mean that the pattern of the 
proletarian intermediate stage had ceased to be of any effect by then, 
any more than the fact that other factors predominated up to the end 
of the last century means that no influence at all of the modern pattern 
could be ascertained before that time. The rise in the percentage of 
married women aged 15-44, which sets in again after 1895 and then 
continues unabated, indicates that the tendency to marry early and 
often is steadily increasing. It may be assumed that the group of 
proletarianized workers in particular—a group which was growing 
relatively larger—played a part in this development. It proved possible 
to demonstrate this in respect of the proletarianized agricultural la-
bourers in northeast Groningenl). An increase in nuptiality however, 
does not yet always mean the presence of the pattern of the proletarian 
intermediate stage within a certain group. As already mentioned, this 
conception also implies unlimited—or practically unlimited—repro-
duction in marriage. One of the most striking and best-known aspects 
of the growth of birth control, however, is that it first asserts itself 
in the upper strata of our society and only later makes its effect felt 
further down the scale. During this initial period, birth control un-
doubtedly had only a slight effect on the workers, so that the relative 
increase in their numbers and their more frequent and earlier marriages 
presumably meant that with them fertility was still increasing, whereas 
x) E. W. HOFSTEE, 'De ontwikkeling van de huwelijksvruchtbaarheid in het 
Old-ambt in de periode 1880-1950' (Marital Fertility Trends in the Oldambt 
district between 1880 and 1950), De wtreld der mensen (The World of Men), 1955. 
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in the upper social groups it was obviously already declining r). It 
could be demonstrated that, for a considerable time after 1890, there 
continued to be practically unlimited reproduction among the greater 
part of the agricultural labourers in northeast Groningen, just mention-
ed, whereas a very distinct decline in marital fertility was already oc-
curring among the farmers in those parts 2). Nor do the statistics for 
a town like Amsterdam, for example, indicate that, around the turn of 
the century, wide strata of the population were already engaged in 
birth control. On the other hand, the influence of the agrarian-artisan 
reproductive pattern was not exhausted by 1890 but from then on it 
became relatively slighter. In the first place, because of the trend in 
modern economic development there was a steady decrease in the 
relative size of the group to whose living conditions this pattern was 
particularly suited, i.e. the farmers and the artisan middle-class. In the 
second place, in various parts of the country—as the example of north-
east Groningen shows—the modern reproductive pattern pervaded 
this group quite early on. In the third place, it was becoming less and 
less necessary for children from these groups to remain unwed, be-
cause opportunities for obtaining a livelihood outside the parental 
undertaking were increasing all the time; a consequence among other 
things of the growth of modern industry. With reference to the farmers' 
group, it may be pointed out that because of the great increase in the 
reclamation of waste land as a result of the use of artificial fertilizers at 
the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th, and also be-
cause of better changes for smallholdings, the opportunities for start-
ing new farms, particularly on sandy soil, greatly increased, so that 
many farmers' sons who wished to stay on the land were no longer 
faced with the necessity of remaining unmarried 3). 
Both the continued existence (and actual expansion to new groups) 
of the pattern of the proletarian intermediate stage and the increased 
means of subsistence open to those population groups which clung in 
principle to the agrarian-artisan pattern, helped to stimulate the birth 
rate. The trend of the birth rate at the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th, therefore, was the result of mutually opposing 
forces. The forces stimulating a rise in the birth rate, however, lost 
ground steadily because the pattern of modern birth control was 
*) HOFSTEE, 'Hu-welijksvtuchtbaarheid Oldambt'. 2) HOFSTEE, 'Regionale verscheidenheid ... etc.', including table 7. 
') E. W. HOFSTEE, 'De landbouw en de migratie' (Agriculture and Migration), 
Economisch-Statistische Bericbten (Economic-Statistical Reports) Dec. 1950. 
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spreading more and more widely to include gradually the working 
population, and displacing the pattern of the proletarian intermediate 
stage on the one hand and the agrarian-artisan pattern on the other. 
In view of this situation, we are justified in regarding the problem 
of fertility trends since the end of the 19th century as primarily a ques-
tion of the how, when, where, and why of the development of the 
pattern of modern birth control. 
Many theories are, of course, advanced to explain the modern de-
cline in fertility. It is not our intention to give a comprehensive sum-
mary of these here, and then to ascertain how far they may help to 
explain the trend in the Netherlands as illustrated by the data in the 
foregoing pages. It seems advisable, however, to compare develop-
ments in the Netherlands with some of the more important theories in 
this field. 
The oldest theories are those which connect population trends with 
economic developments. Here a distinction should be made between 
the theories which award pride of place to economic developments 
and see population trends as mainly derivative, and those which look 
upon population trends themselves as the prime dynamic factor. The 
motion that the population—whether by way of mortality or natality 
adjusts itself to the means of subsistence has never quite lost signifi-
cance since MALTHUS, but it seems litde suited to explain long-term 
fertility trends in the western world during recent centuries. Only 
minor fluctuations in the birth rate running parallel to business cycles 
could be explained partly, at least—by this theory. 
Opposed to this, are the theories which hold that economic develop-
ments are, in fact, largely dependent on the growth of the population, 
i.e. that economic developments rather than population growth are 
the dependent variable. In the Netherlands this view has recently 
found another champion in D E ROOS X), who writes: "that population 
increase, as such, is a factor favourable to the growth of prosperity, 
since it actually causes the real per capita incomes to rise in the long 
run". As a recent article indicates, SAUVY takes the same view 2). 
The theories just mentioned, which in fact credit population trends 
with autonomy, do not, in themselves, help to explain fertility trends, 
x) F. DE Roos, Bevolking en Welvaart (Population and Pf osperity), 1960. See also 
the opposing article by Prof. J. PEN in the Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 19th July 
1960. 
2) A. SAUVY, 'Evolution recente des id6es sur le surpeuplement' (Recent de-
velopments in views on over-population) Population Volume 15, I960, pp. 467-
484. 
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and may be left out of consideration for the moment although we 
shall revert to them later in another connection. 
The adjustment theory was polished up yet again a few years ago by 
COONTZ x) in a remarkable and pretentious book and, in his opinion, 
rendered capable of explaining fertility trends in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. He thinks that longterm fertility trends are determined by 
the trend of the demand for manpower. According to him, not only 
should the total demand for labour be taken into account, but also 
the demand for different categories of workers. The remarkable thing 
is that the entire book contains hardly any statistics at all relating to 
fertility or population growth. In expounding his own theory, the 
author is actually only putting forward an economic argument and, 
as far as concrete data are concerned, he contents himself with a vague 
reference to the difference in the development of modern industry in 
England and in France and to what he considers the corresponding 
difference in the fertility trends. In actual fact, therefore, he offers no 
proof at all of the correctness of his thesis 'that population is the de-
pendent variable reflecting both long- and short-run changes in de-
mand for labour' 2). The question as to how this long-term adjustment 
of population growth to employment trends was to be realized from 
an institutional and psychological point of view is almost completely 
ignored by COONTZ. 
The primary objection to the views of COONTZ, and of others who 
put forward similar theories, is that they insist upon the absolute pre-
eminence of the economic factor and completely ignore the others. 
That economic developments do have a certain effect upon population 
growth in general and upon the level of fertility in particular, is, of 
course, undeniable. The agrarian-artisan reproductive pattern which 
we have just discussed is an obvious form of the adjustment of the 
number of progeny to the available means of subsistence. Needless to 
say, the existing population requires a minimum means of subsistence 
in order to stay alive. What is frequently forgotten, however, is that 
every society which is slightly more developed can support a consider-
able 'dilution' of the means of subsistence without this meaning that 
the limit of the physical subsistence minimum of the population as a 
whole, or of a large part of it, is exceeded 3). 
The striking thing about fertility trends in the 19th and 20th centu-
1) S. H, COONTZ, Population theories and the economic interpretation, 1957. 
2) COONTZ, p . 183. 
3) Admittedly COONTZ himself makes indirect allowance for this. 
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ries is precisely that they have so largely detached themselves from 
economic developments. This is particularly true of the trend in the 
marital and childbearing pattern referred to above as the pattern of the 
proletarian intermediate stage. COONTZ holds that the explanation of 
the rise in the excess of births over deaths in 19th century England lies 
in the increased demand for unskilled labour resulting from the first 
stage of the industrial revolution. As has been said, he draws a com-
parison with France, yet he does not even mention concrete facts 
about England as further proof of the existence of this connection. It 
cannot be denied that there is a certain link between the growth of 
industry in the 19th century and the increase of the birth rate and, as 
far as the Netherlands is concerned, this was demonstrated in detail 
in the article mentioned earlier 1). The connection, however, as the 
article attempts to show, is not direct but indirect. The fundamental 
cause of the increase in fertility is the evolution of a proletarianized 
working class and the change this involved in the marital and child-
bearing patterns of the population groups affected. That it was not—as 
COONTZ assumes—the great demand for manpower which brought 
about this increase in fertility—at least as far as the Netherlands was 
concerned—is clearly illustrated by the vast unemployment concomi-
tant with the rise in fertility in the 19th century. Further, it must be 
pointed out that fertility also increased in various agricultural areas in 
the north of the country, for instance, where proletarianization took 
place, although there was no question of industrial influence. COONTZ'S 
contention regarding the trend of the decline of fertility since the end 
of the 19th century is very far from being convincing. He considers 
that the decline must be attributed to a deceleration of economic 
progress since the close of the 19th century coupled with a fall in the 
demand for manpower in general, as well as to a shift in the nature of 
the demand for workers from unskilled to skilled. Apart from the 
question as to whether this deceleration was common to all the western 
world (one gains the impression that COONTZ, who quotes only Engli sh 
or translated literature, practically overlooks the continent of Europe 
and quite simply forgets all about the enormous economic expansion 
of Germany in the period before the First World War, for example), 
a more detailed comparison between economic developments and 
employment on the one hand and fertility trends on the other prove s 
that this explanation is inadequate. In the Netherlands, for instance , 
*) HOFSTEE, "Regionale verscheidenheid ... etc.". 
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births started to decline first and most rapidly in the provinces of North 
and South Holland but, at the very time when this decline was clearly 
asserting itself, there was a rapid increase in employment in these 
areas, as the vast stream of migrants which trekked to the west from 
other provinces also serves to demonstrate. 
Let me repeat that the purpose of the foregoing is not, by any 
means, to deny that economic developments do have a certain in-
fluence on fertility, but to stress the fact that, for an explanation of 
fertility trends in the 19th and 20th centuries in particular, reference 
to economic developments is only of limited value x). 
Another familiar theory is the one which attributes the birth rate 
decline in the 19th and 20th centuries to the growing prosperity, which 
supposedly brought the 'cheapest pleasure', i.e. sexual intercourse, 
into competition with pleasures from other sources. Apart from the 
errors (also referred to by COONTZ 2) which can be detected in the basic 
reasoning of this theory, it suffers from the objection that, even at 
its best, it could do no more than provide a limited explanation for a 
certain period in the demographic history of the western world. It is a 
typical theory of the period, when a clear distinction became apparent 
between the marital fertility of the more well-to-do and that of the 
workers, and when one could almost gauge the social status of the 
various strata of society by their respective fertility. We know that 
these differences are tending to disappear and that, here and there, a 
reversal of the relationships can be observed. I was able, for example, 
to record such a reversal in the Netherlands, in Northeast Groningen 
where the fertility of the agricultural labourers is now dropping below 
that of the farmers8). Moreover, this theory entirely ignores the 
circumstance that povertystricken farmers have presumably been re-
stricting the number of their offspring for centuries by means of the 
agrarian-artisan reproductive system previously mentioned, a facet of 
which was severe repression of the sexual drive among a large sector 
of the population4). 
Among the popular theories on the progress of the fall in the birth 
rate is the one about the influence of urbanization on fertility decline. 
In certain regions and during certain periods a connection can certainly 
*) HOFSTEE, "Regionale veischeidenheid ... etc." and "Huwelijksvruchtbaar-
heid, Oldambt". 
2) COONTZ, p. 68. 
8) HOFSTEE, "Huwelijksvruchtbaarheid Oldambt". 
4) See, among others on this subject, P. A. BARENTSEN, "Het Oude Kempenland" 
(Old Kempenland), 1935. 
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be shown between fertility and the degree of urbanization but, as 
various authors have already pointed out, it is difficult to maintain 
that there is any question of a direct and general connection between 
urbanization and fertility trends1). The maps reproduced here clearly 
demonstrate anew that this is indeed not the case, and that the fertility 
decline is in origin by no means a typically urban phenomenon. As 
early as the period between 1851-1855 and 1876-1880, unmistakable 
centres of declining fertility can be detected in the rural areas of the 
peninsula of North Holland and in Zeeland. At this time, Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and The Hague were still recording a rise in the birth rate. 
Even in the period between 1876-1880 and 1901-1905, the birth rate 
decline in various rural areas in the west of the Netherlands still ex-
ceeds that in the big cities just mentioned. It is not until the next 
period that the decline really asserts itself in the big towns. By then, 
however, the tendency has largely passed its peak in the peninsula of 
North Holland and in the west of the province of Friesland. 
In discussions on fertility trends in the Netherlands, the question 
of a connection between religion and fertility has always played a 
major role and still does so today. VAN HEEK2), especially, firmly 
refocussed attention on this connection a few years ago and, in par-
ticular, on the Roman Catholic opposition to a fall in fertility en-
countered in the Netherlands. 
Analysis of the data on the birth rate contained in maps 2, 3, 4 and 
5 bears out my conviction that there is a tendency in the Netherlands 
to overestimate the significance of church and religion as regards the 
level of fertility. In the period between 1851-1855 and 1876-1880 an 
area shows up in the peninsula of North Holland, and notably in 
West Friesland, where a fairly sharp decline in the birth rate is re-
corded. Yet in this mixed Roman Catholic and Protestant region no 
indication can be found of an obvious difference in behaviour between 
the predominantly Catholic municipalities and the predominantly 
x) For the absence of an obvious straightforward connection between urbani-
sation and fertility decline, see: COONTZ; J. MEERDINK, "De achteruitgang der 
geboorten" (The Decline in the Birth Rate), 1937; HOFSTEE "Regionale verschei-
denheid ... etc.". PETERSEN points out that in the Netherlands, in spite of a high 
degree of urbanization in the material sense, the birth rate remains high because 
urban attitudes (urbanism) make little headway. As will appear, the use of the term 
"urbanism" to indicate the modern state of mind does not seem to me very ap-
propriate, moreover, this modern mentality did not develop uniformly late all 
over the Netherlands. (W. PETERSEN, Planned Migration, 1955). 
2) F. VAN HEEK, Het geboorte-niveau der Nederlandse Rooms-Katholieken, 
1954 (The Birth Rate Level among Dutch Roman Catholics). 
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Protestant ones. There is no question there yet of a homogenous area 
of decline, but participation or non-participation in the decline does 
not run parallel to the religious relationships in the municipalities in 
question. Certainly the municipalities of southern Kennemerland, 
where there is also known to be quite a high percentage of Roman 
Catholics, show a fairly sharp rise, but this again is offset by the fact 
that various municipalities in the bulbgrowing areas in the north of 
South Holland, where there is also a high percentage of Roman 
Catholics, record a noticeably rapid fall in the birth rate during this 
period. In Zeeland, too, little can be discerned at this time of a con-
nection between religion and fertility trends. In eastern Zeeuws-
Vlaanderen, for example, the two municipalities which show a dis-
tinct fall (present-day Hontenisse and Vogelwaarde) are both pre-
dominantly Roman Catholic. 
In the following period, which is characterized by a furdaer decline 
in the birth rate in the west and north of the country, the same 
pattern can be observed. In the province of Friesland, the munici-
palities in the southwest with a strong Roman Catholic minority 
actually stand out among municipalities in the vicinity because of a 
noticeably sharp decline. In Groningen, the municipality of Klooster-
buren, which has the highest percentage of Roman Catholics in the 
province, does not differ from the surrounding areas as regards the 
birth rate trend. In and around West Friesland there are still no 
marked differences between municipalities with predominantly Catho-
lic inhabitants and those with a predominantly non-Catholic popu-
lation. Practically all of them record a fairly sharp decline, although 
in some—not all—of the predominantly Catholic municipalities it 
proceeds rather more slowly than elsewhere. With only a few ex-
ceptions the Catholic municipalities in the west of the country register 
quite a considerable decline in birth rate. A map illustrating birth 
rates around the turn of the century thus bears comparatively little 
resemblance to a map showing the geographical distribution of Roman 
Catholicism. Birth rates in the west of West Friesland and in North 
Kennemerland are a little higher than in some other parts of North 
Holland but, when detailed comparisons are made, there is very little 
evidence of a typically Roman Catholic birth rate pattern. In the 
period 1891-1895, Amsterdam, for example, still has a higher birth 
rate than predominantly Catholic municipalities in West Friesland. 
The bulb-growing areas in South Holland, the so-called "Venen" 
district and the Westland, all characterized by a high percentage of 
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Roman Catholics, are not clearly distinguishable from districts in the 
vicinity. And in Zeeland, too, there is little or no sign of a connection 
between religion and fertility. 
When the location of the sharp fall in the birth rate shifts to the 
south-east in the period between 1901-1905 and 1931-1935, there is 
still no conspicuous difference between Catholic and non-Catholic 
municipalities. It is especially remarkable that in western—but also 
central—North Brabant many purely Catholic townships participate 
to a considerable extent in the birth rate decline, whereas in the east 
of this province and in most of Limburg the birth rate remains 
stationary or even rises. Nor is there any clear connection in the east 
of Gelderland or in "Twente". In these areas along the eastern fron-
tier, a narrow belt of municipalities is still to be found where, even 
in this period, only a slight fall in the birth rate is registered, and 
sometimes even a rise. In this belt, urban municipalities and others 
strongly affected by industry form enclaves characterized by a sharp 
fall in the birth rate. Roman Catholic municipalities, however, form 
just as much part of these enclaves as non-Catholic ones. Thus the 
birth rate decline in Nymegen and in Oldenzaal is on the same scale 
as in Arnhem and Winterswyk and Enschede, while in the industrial 
area of Oude Yssel predominantly Roman Catholic municipalities like 
Bergh and Gendringen and predominantly non-Catholic ones like 
Wisch an Dinxperlo participate equally in the birth rate decline. On 
the other hand, in predominantly Protestant and rural municipalities 
like Eibergen, Ruurlo, Zelhem and Hummelo and Keppel, the fall in 
the birth rate is just as limited as in the predominantly Catholic and 
rural municipalities in the "Lymers" district. Nor is there much evi-
dence of a relation between the fall in the birth rate and the distribution 
of Roman Catholicism in the eastern provinces, west of this belt of 
municipalities along the frontier with Germany. It is worth noting, 
however, that the birth rate remains practically stationary in Raalte 
and Heino, two municipalities in the predominantly Roman Catholic 
district of Salland. 
It should be observed that here and there in Roman Catholic 
municipalities in the western provinces during this period, the birth 
rate starts to differ rather more obviously from that of places in the 
vicinity than was the case earlier. In a number of municipalities in the 
peninsula of North Holland, and particularly in West Friesland, having 
reached a low ebb around 1900 the birth rate begins to rise again 
slightly in this period. The phenomenon is usually more apparent in 
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the Catholic municipalities than in the non-Catholic ones. In Westland 
and surrounding districts, although—with an occasional exception— 
the birth rate does not rise during this period, there is a reduction in 
the rate of fall. In the period 1931-1935, the west of West Friesland, 
Westland and its vicinity, and also the bulb-growing district in South 
Holland and the "Venen" district have noticeably higher birth rates 
than the surrounding areas. The phenomenon, however, is by no 
means common to all the areas in the west wich have a high proportion 
of Roman Catholics. In the first quarter of the present century, North 
Kennemerland registers a sharp fall in the birth rate and in the period 
1931-1935 it is hardly remarkable for high figures. Nor are the Catho-
lic areas in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen exceptional in this respect; during this 
period they do not differ from other parts of the area either, and in the 
thirties their birth rate corresponds to the general trend. It is worth 
noting that the areas in the west of the country^ where the Roman 
Catholic municipalities in general have a somewhat higher birth rate 
than other places in the region, are horticultural districts. 
If the birth rate statistics were calculated separately for Catholic and 
non-Catholic municipalities in those parts of the Netherlands that, up 
to the early thirties, were affected by the sharp fall in the birth rate, 
it would presumably transpire that the Catholic municipalities, on 
average, record a somewhat smaller birth rate decline than the non-
Catholic ones. The difference, however, would prove to be one of 
degree not of kind, and in various areas, doubtless, of practically no 
significance. The general long term pattern of the regional fertility 
trends in the Netherlands is apparently determined by factors not 
connected at all, or only to a limited extent, with the dissemination of 
the Roman Catholic religion1). 
l) The publication of the Dutch version of this article led to a lengthy dis-
cussion in the journal entitled 'Mens en Maatschappij' (Man and Society), vol. 28, 
pp. 81-133 and 257-277, between the author and Professor F. VAN HEEK. The gist 
of VAN HEEK'S contention is that, in his opinion, in my article I underestimated 
the significance of the religious factor (and in particular the influence of Roman 
Catholicism) on the level of fertility in the Netherlands. I am convinced—as I 
explained in the course of the discussion—that in fact VAN HEEK'S criticisms have 
practically no bearing on the essence of my research, so that the discussion lost 
much of its value. As is also apparent from some of his other publications, VAN 
HEEK is primarily interested in differences in the fertility levels of Catholics and 
non-Catholics during a comparatively recent period—he never mentions fertility 
prior to 1900—whereas my study is devoted to the process of the natality decline 
in the Netherlands as a whole during the entire period in which the modern mass 
decline in fertility has been in operation in any part of the Netherlands. I have of 
course never denied, as the reader can ascertain repeatedly from the article in 
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Finally then, the most recent period. As already indicated, the map 
illustrating-the trend during this period (map 5) is, in many respects, 
the exact opposite of the map for the last quarter of the 19th century 
(map 3). Closer examination of map 5, and comparison with the maps 
for the earlier periods, can lead to a more specific conclusion. Most of 
question, that the Roman Catholic faith does have an influence upon the level of 
the birth rate in the Netherlands. What I did—and still do—deny is that this 
influence is of essential significance in the total process of the fertility decline in 
the Netherlands. The way in which the influence of Roman Catholicism has 
affected the fertility trend in the Netherlands can be deduced in part from various 
observations contained in this article, but I have demonstrated the point still 
further, with extensive data, in the discussion just mentioned. It appears that in 
those parts of the Netherlands where the modem fertility decline set in early—in 
the North and West, that is to say—the fertility decline in predominantly non-
Catholic municipalities runs virtually parallel for some decades with the decline 
in predominantly Catholic municipalities in the same areas. About 1910, however 
—a little earlier in one area, a little later in another—the fertility decline begins to 
slow down somewhat in the predominantly Catholic municipalities compared 
with the situation in the predominantly non-Catholic municipalities in the same 
areas. The effect of course is that in subsequent years fertility remains at a higher 
level in these Catholic municipalities than in the comparable non-Catholic ones. 
Generally speaking the process of deceleration continues into the thirties. After 
that, the gap between the fertility levels of comparable predominantly Catholic 
and predominantly non-Catholic municipalities gradually diminishes again. How-
ever interesting this temporary slowing-down in the process of the fertility decline 
among the Catholics may be in itself, it is virtually independent of the remarkable 
and conspicuous trend of the fertility decline in the Netherlands as demonstrated 
by the material published in this article, The essential features of the process of 
the regional fertility trend in the Netherlands are the gradual shift of the fertility 
decline from the Northwest to the Southeast and, in consequence of that, a con-
siderable difference between the various parts of the country as regards the time 
at which the fertility decline begins to manifest itself as a large-scale phenomenon. 
This is the reason for the conclusion that: 'The long-term general pattern of the 
regional fertility trends in the Netherlands is apparently determined by factors not 
connected at all, or only to a limited extent, with the dissemination of the Roman 
Catholic religion'. This conclusion—as has already been said—does not imply 
any denial of the fact that during a certain period a deceleration of the fertility 
decline among the Catholics was superimposed upon the general trend resulting, 
in various areas, in a more or less considerable divergence between fertility levels 
in predominantly Catholic municipalities and in the non-Catholic districts around. 
It should be pointed out that subsequent to the publication of the Dutch version 
of this article Miss HENRIETTE DAMAS demonstrated a trend in the fertility decline 
in Belgium similar to that ascertained here for the Netherlands, with this differ-
ence that there the decline starts in the South and gradually shifts to the Northeast, 
so that the area where the decline manifests itself last in Belgium adjoins the 
Southeastern part of the Netherlands where the decline likewise commenced later 
than elsewhere. (HENRIETTE DAMAS, Le mouvement naturel de la population 
Beige, son evolution de 1846 a I960, Population etFamille, vol. I, no 2, pp. 64-101). 
In fact Miss DAMAS herself concludes: 'This evolution of fertility in our country 
follows a course completely parallel to that demonstrated by Professor Hofstee 
for the Netherlands' (p. 65). 
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the areas of decline on map 5 are those with a static or even a rising 
birth rate, in the period between 1871-1875 and 1901-1905, but they 
also partly correspond with areas where the decline slowed down or 
a rise set in during the period between 1901-1905 and 1931-1935. A 
striking example of this last point is formed by Westland and its 
vicinity, where the deceleration already recorded in the previous 
period is followed by a conspicuous decline in the most recent period. 
The conclusion implicit in the foregoing is that, just as no clear 
connection could be established between non-participation in the fall of 
the birth rate and the distribution of the Roman Catholic religion in 
the previous periods, in the period now under consideration no direct 
connection can be demonstrated between adherence to this religion 
and participation. Thus in the west of North Brabant there is an un-
broken, predominantly Roman Catholic area—approximately the 
same area that, as early as the beginning of this century, recorded a 
sharp decline in the birth rate—where, during the most recent period, 
the birth rate has remained at approximately the same level. In the 
Roman Catholic municipalities of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen there is, gener-
ally speaking, no question of a decline in the birth rate. In the pen-
insula of North Holland, which is distinguished during this period by 
a relatively sharp rise in the birth rate, various Catholic municipalities 
follow the same trend, although it is presumably the non-Catholics 
who are mainly responsible for the increase. In Friesland, which 
generally speaking also shows a fairly sharp rise, there is in fact no 
evidence at all of a connection between Roman Catholicism and birth 
rate trends. The area of conspicuous decline in the southern Wester-
kwartier district of Groningen and some neighbouring districts of 
Friesland and Drenthe is not Roman Catholic. Nevertheless, in the 
last quarter of the last century, this area clearly lagged behind North 
Groningen and the north and west of Friesland in the birth rate 
decline. The link between the trend in the last quarter of the 19th 
century and that of the last 25 years is even more striking in the east 
of Drenthe, particularly in the so-called peat colonies and an adjoining 
district in the east of Groningen—all areas where we need not bother 
about the idea of any connection with the spread of the Roman 
Catholic religion. Not only was no decline in the birth rate recorded 
there at the end of the 19th century; a considerable rise actually took 
place. 
The decline which occured during the period between 1931-1935 
and 1956-1959 in the northeast of Groningen had nothing to do with 
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the dissemination of Roman Catholicism: the district is almost ex-
clusively Protestant. For that matter, in the greater part of this area 
a considerable decline was already apparent in the preceding periods. 
Therefore there can be no talk of 'compensation' here for a reduction 
in the rate of decline during the preceding periods, or at least only to 
a very limited extent, perhaps in connection with the municipalities 
of Midwolda and Termunten. An area has developed here with crude 
birth rates that are extremely low by Dutch standards. It is the largest 
unbroken area in the Netherlands with birth rates of under 20 per 
1,000. Without trying to establish a connection here at the moment, it 
should be remembered that this region, perhaps more than any other 
in the Netherlands, was characterized by proletarianization of agri-
cultural labourers in the 19th century and—in many cases coupled 
with this—by fierce radicalism in the political opinions of this par-
ticular population group. 
So much for the relationship between the progress of the birth rate 
decline and the distribution of the Roman Catholic religion. Now, in 
the Netherlands it is not only the Roman Catholics but also the ad-
herents of the Calvinist Reformed Churches, the "Gereformeerden", 
whose birth rates are above the national average. Is it perhaps possible 
to discover an obvious connection between the geographical distri-
bution of the "Gereformeerden" and the regional trend of the de-
clining birth rate? There are nine predominantly "Gereformeerde" 
municipalities in Groningen, two in Friesland, a few widely-scattered 
and usually small municipalities in the southwest and one (Bunschoten) 
in Utrecht. Municipalities with a high proportion of "Gereformeer-
den" are widely found in Friesland and Groningen, in the southwest 
of the country and also scattered here and there over other provinces. 
In view of the extensive discussion just devoted to the relationship 
between Roman Catholicism and the decline of the birth rate, there is 
not much point in going into similar details about the connection 
between natality and the regional distribution of the "Gereformeer-
den". The situation regarding "Gereformeerden" is basically no 
different from that regarding Roman Catholics. If, for the various 
periods covered by this investigation, we examine the trends in the 
predominantly or strongly "Gereformeerde" municipalities in that 
part of the country where, during a given period, a sharp decline in 
the birth rate prevails, we shall reach the conclusion that in this case 
too, on average, it is possible to talk of the birth rate declining some-
what more slowly among "Gereformeerden". Broadly speaking, how-
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ever, these municipalities follow the regional trend of the birth rate 
decline which can be established for the country as a whole. In an 
occasional case—e.g. Bunschoten, the most strongly "Gereformeerde" 
municipality in the whole country—the decline obviously proceeds 
more slowly than in other places in the area, but these are the ex-
ceptions that prove the rule. Together with the peninsula of North 
Holland, Zeeland with its high proportion of "Gereformeerden" is 
the region where the declining birth rate first becomes clearly ap-
parent. As early as the last quarter of the 19th century, a noticeably 
rapid fall in the birth rate is recorded in the centre of North Gronin-
gen, where there is an unbroken block of predominantly "Gerefor-
meerde" municipalities. In Friesland there is little sign of a connection 
between the distribution of "Gereformeerden" and regional differ-
entiation in the trend of the birth rate decline. 
Thus, in the west and north the "Gereformeerden" participate in 
the relatively early birth rate decline but, in the east of the country, 
the decline apparently affects them—like the rest of the inhabitants— 
only at a later date. In this respect, an unbroken area with a high 
proportion of strict "Gereformeerden" in southeast Drenthe and 
northeast Overyssel differs not at all from other places in the environ-
ment. As for the Dutch Reformed Church—the largest Protestant 
Church group—it is difficult to make any general statements about it 
in this connection because of the widely divergent religious views held 
by its members. It may be pointed out, however, that the curious belt 
of municipalities containing a high proportion of Dutch Reformed 
Church members with ultra-orthodox tendencies which extends from 
the western Veluwe district, across the river areas of the west to the 
islands of South Holland and Zeeland, display no distinctive charac-
teristics in the falling birth rate trend. 
Finally, we must devote some attention to the distribution of the 
non-churchgoing population. Besides the large towns and suburban 
areas, it is primarily the peninsula of North Holland, southeastern 
Friesland and northeastern Groningen that are characterized by a high 
percentage of irreligious inhabitants. It has already been pointed out 
that the big towns do not head the declining birth rate trend. Even in 
the period between 1876-1880 and 1901-1905, when a tendency 
towards separation from the churches could already be observed 
there, the decline in the birth rate in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The 
Hague was smaller than in many rural municipalities in the vicinity, 
including several where the influence of religion was strong. Nor did 
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the suburban municipalities in the Gooi district, for instance, start 
participating in the birth rate decline at a noticeably early stage. Ad-
mittedly, after the turn of the century, birth rates fell extremely rapidly 
in the large towns of North and South Holland, ultimately reaching 
a level lower than that of the surrounding area but this was equally 
true of towns with a homogenous, or overwhelmingly, Roman 
Catholic population so that this phenomenon can presumably be 
attributed only in part to non-churchgoing as such. 
As has been observed several times already, the birth rate decline 
certainly starts early in North Holland but, as may be deduced from 
the foregoing, it is not the case that the municipalities leading the 
trend to a declining birth rate are precisely those which subsequently 
turn out to be strongly non-churchgoing. Further, it should be 
remembered that by the third quarter of the 19th century many 
municipalities in churchminded Zeeland were also displaying a definite 
decline in fertility. 
In the non-churchgoing region in eastern Friesland, the birth rate 
decline asserts itself later than in the west of this province, and in 
northeast Groningen, which is extremely irreligious, the decline 
comes later than in North Groningen, where religion plays a far more 
positive role. As already mentioned, it should be noted that the birth 
rate in northeast Groningen later falls to an exceptionally low level 
for the Netherlands. In Friesland, now, generally speaking, the birth 
rate is also somewhat lower in the largely non-churchgoing munici-
palities than in those that are more religiously inclined, but the 
difference is not very marked and in some cases cannot be demon-
strated at all. In North Holland generally one can hardly talk of any 
connection between non-churchgoing and a steady decline of the 
birth rate to a conspicuously low level. On the whole, in the years 
following the Second World War, the peninsula of North Holland is 
characterized by comparatively high birth rates, including those of 
municipalities with a relatively high percentage of non-churchgoing 
inhabitants. 
There is, therefore, no question of the birth rate decline becoming 
conspicuous early in areas which subsequently become known as 
focuses of non-churchgoing, but in some cases a considerable degree 
of separation from the church goes hand in hand with the ultimate 
decline of the birth rate to a relatively low level. The point is, how-
ever, to what extent there is any direct connection between the two 
in the areas concerned. As regards northeast Groningen, we have 
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already pointed out that, among other things, this region is charac-
terized by decided proletarianization of rural labourers and extreme 
political radicalism; the same is true, although perhaps to a somewhat 
lesser extent, of southeast Friesland. 
Summing up, we may say that, although more detailed analysis 
than is possible within the framework of this article could lead to 
more precise findings, it may nevertheless be concluded that, while a 
certain connection between the regional trend of the birth rate decline 
and the regional situation in respect of church and religion cannot be 
denied, the general outlines of the regional fertility trends since the 
time that the birth rate decline commenced in the country as a whole, 
cannot be accounted for on the basis of the distribution of religion 
and churchgoing. 
Another obvious question is whether the pattern of declining birth 
rates ascertainable in the Netherlands may not be directly connected 
with the trend of the decline in mortality. It is, after all, an undeniable 
fact that throughout the western world there is a certain concurrence 
between the trend of the mortality rate and that of the birth rate, it 
being understood that, generally speaking, the decline in the mortality 
rate occurs first and is followed after a certain interval by the decline 
in the birth rate. Having established this concurrence, it is but a small 
step to the hypothesis of a connection. Since the decline in mortality 
has a special bearing on deaths at an early age, this means in the first 
instance an increase in the number of persons surviving to be a 
liability to their parents and—another aspect—to share in any inherit-
ance, and the assumption is easily made that birth control will be 
practised in an attempt to relieve the strain and to prevent the frag-
mentation of property through inheritance. There is undoubtedly 
some connection between the decline of the birth rate and the death 
rate respectively, but we must beware of taking it too much for 
granted and of looking on it as a direct connection. 
The relationship between the falling birth rate and the falling death 
rate has already been discussed in the article cited several times 
earlier1), and the question will come up again when we are considering 
mortality. For the sake of brevity, therefore, we shall content our-
selves here with observing that the factual data on the trend of the 
birth rate decline (time and place) on the one hand, and of the mor-
tality decline on the other, reveal that the assumption of a direct and 
L) HOFSTEE, "Regionale verscheidenheid . . . etc.' p. 92 et seq. 
80 E. W. HOFSTEE 
simple connection between declining mortality and declining fertility 
is not sufficient to explain the pattern of the decline in fertility. Let 
us mention a few facts. At the end of the 19th century marital fertility 
in the province of North Brabant was not only no lower than it had 
been around 1850, it was actually quite a bit higher. And this in spite 
of the fact that a not insignificant—although relatively late—decline 
in mortality took place in the province as a whole during the second 
half of the 19th century. The excess of births over deaths, that is to 
say the pressure exerted on their elders by the younger generation, 
also increased here considerably in the last half of the 19th century. 
It is true that, in the third quarter of the last century, the excess of 
births over deaths in the peninsula of North Holland was high, but 
generally speaking it was no higher than in various other parts of the 
country, so that it can hardly be held to account for the early decline 
of the birth rate in this particular area. Something similar is true of 
those parts of Zeeland where the birth rate first started to decline. At 
the beginning of the period following 1850, the excess of births over 
deaths was actually relatively small there as a result of the high mor-
tality rates still prevailing in Zeeland at that time. 
Taking the situation in general, the mortality decline also displays 
a gradual shift from the north and west to the east and south—I shall 
be reverting to this in detail later. Talcing it region by region, how-
ever, there are so many local and temporal differences between the 
decline in fertility and the mortality decline that generally speaking 
there is no trend of a growing birth surplus gradually shifting from 
north and west to south and east. During the last century the birth 
surplus always displayed an irregular pattern. As has already been 
said, therefore, the regional trends of the birth rate patterns in the 
Netherlands cannot be automatically regarded as an immediate re-
action to the increasing pressure of population resulting from the 
decline in the mortality rate, although this does not mean that this 
same decline did not represent a force operating continuously in 
favour of a declining birth rate. 
Now if the curious trend in regional development of the birth rate 
in the Netherlands cannot be accounted for, except to a very limited 
extent, by any of the phenomena already mentioned, where should 
we look for the real cause? 
It seems to me that the most fertile supposition is that which 
connects the decline of the birth rate with the gradual development 
of the modern-dynamic pattern of culture in the western world, more 
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particularly in the Netherlands. In my opinion, the significance of the 
degree to which, and time at which, various population groups in the 
western world start participating in the transition from the pattern of 
culture that may be called traditionalistic to the modern-dynamic 
pattern is, as a rule, underestimated as a possible explanation for the 
difference in social behaviour. The essential difference between the 
two patterns of culture lies, I think, in the attitude towards change. 
In the traditionalistic pattern of culture, the norm for judging the 
actions of oneself and of others lies in the past. Everything must go 
on as it always has done. Change, irrespective of its nature, is wrong. 
If circumstances enforce a change of behaviour, attempts are made to 
justify this, if at all possible, on the ground that it is a return to forms 
of behaviour erroneously departed from. 
In the modern-dynamic pattern of culture, change is, in principle, 
accorded positive appreciation. Modern-dynamic man has faith in the 
possibility of improvement through change and is prepared to investi-
gate the worth of the opportunities for it with which he is confronted. 
This does not mean that he regards everything new as unconditionally 
better; upon further consideration he may conclude that things were 
better as they were. Unlike traditionalistic man, however, he does not 
reject what is new just because it is new. This modern-dynamic men-
tality originated in the Italian Renaissance. For several centuries after 
that it resembled a rather thin thread running through the fabric of 
western civilization, of definite influence certainly, but affecting rela-
tively few people. In the 18th century, however, and particularly in 
the second half of it, modern-dynamic thinking began to assume 
large-scale proportions. It largely pervaded the middle classes and 
began to exert more and more influence on the actions of the leaders 
of society. This does not imply, however, that it was at that time al-
ready starting to dominate society as a whole. It gravitated relatively 
slowly from the higher social strata to the lower ones, and it was 
quite late in the 19th century before it began to make its influence 
widely felt among the greater part of the agrarian population and the 
working class. . 
Even today, in the most highly-developed countries of western 
Europe, modern-dynamic thought has not yet entirely supplanted 
traditionalistic thought. Many elements of a traditionalistic attitude 
to life can still be found, not only among the small farmers—the 
peasants—but also among other population groups, although the rem-
nants of the old patterns of thought are now disintegrating very rapidly. 
Acta Hist. Neerlandica, III 6 
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A great many other characteristics of the modern-dynamic pattern 
of culture are implicit in the positive attitude towards change. Modern-
dynamic man does not hold himself aloof from the outside world; he 
is ready to receive new impressions. He does not rely on tradition, nor 
take on trust the views of former generations. He strives to be more 
knowledgeable than the previous generation and is interested in 
education in the widest sense. He does not conform to anonymous 
public opinion, but will try to evaluate the things with which he is 
confronted on their own merits. He will therefore be inclined to make 
himself more independent of family, village or neighbourhood ties, 
and will display a stronger tendency towards individualism. Change 
is acceptable not only for himself and his immediate environment; he 
also regards society outside himself as being open to change and 
improvement. A typical expression of this attitude is modern man's 
urge towards organization, the desire to keep re-arranging human and 
material means in order to achieve goals fixed in advance. One form 
in which this urge finds expression is the association, the modern 
form of social activity for realizing given objectives. 
Many others have put forward views on the progress of western 
civilization which are more or less akin to the arguments just ad-
vanced. Yet it seems to me that the latter differ on some points from 
the opinions most commonly held. In the first place, let me point out 
that the use of the words 'rationalistic' or even 'rational' has been 
intentionally avoided. It appears to me that the essential difference 
between traditionalistic and modern thought does not lie in a more 
intellectual response to the situation in which one finds oneself, and 
even less in the elevation of an intellectual response to a vital principle. 
It is true that because modern man is forever contemplating the 
possibility of renewal and change, he is constantly forced to make a 
reasonable assessment of the consequences of such change. It is also 
true that education and training in general, today, are strongly directed 
towards developing the capacity for intellectual consideration, and 
that modern standards award priority to intellectual reasoning in 
discussion and debate. But this does not mean at all that modern man's 
response is, in fact, so much more intellectual than traditionalistic 
man's. One is often struck by the sensible, rational course of action 
adopted in former times when circumstances forced men to face up 
to a really new situation and find a solution for it1). Modern man's 
l) Research into the development of types of land division in the Netherlands 
(E. W. HOFSTEE and A. W. VLAM, 'Opmerkingen over de ontwikkeling van de 
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response to change and renewal, on the other hand, is by no means 
always rational. In rural areas where modern ideas have caught on 
well, for instance, one not infrequently comes across 'modernites', 
an inclination to accept or purchase everything new without reason-
able reflection. New things are accepted on irrational emotional 
grounds because newness, in itself, has acquired a positive emotional 
value. To call modern thought rational, and traditionalistic thought, 
therefore, by implication, irrational or a-rational, does not seem to fit 
in with the facts. Such an attitude is more a product of the 19th 
century belief in progress than of considerations based on a critical 
cultural-historical approach. 
The foregoing is bound up, in part, with the problem of the 
relationship between religious views and the modern-dynamic pattern 
of culture. Many people have long been inclined to consider what was 
regarded as the modern pattern of culture as incompatible with 
orthodox religious views, and to associate it, as matter of course, with 
latitudinarianism or with non-churchgoing1). Now it is certainly true 
that modern-dynamic thought definitely can lead, and has done in the 
past, to ideas and views—such as Rationalism in the narrow sense of 
a cultural movement—that are difficult to reconcile with dogmatic 
religious views. Equally, the churches have often impeded the de-
velopment of modern-dynamic thought because of their strict con-
formity with the existing, traditional, social and cultural order. Yet 
neither of these relationships is either necessary or self-evident. As 
regards the first, we have pointed out above that modern-dynamic 
thought is not always identical with rationalistic thought, nor even 
with rational behaviour. As regards the second, the fact that certain 
basic concepts of a given faith are laid down in the form of more or 
less unalterable rules does not imply immutability of the religious life 
within the church in question, and even less of thought and action in 
respect of temporal matters not affecting dogma, or at least not 
perceelsvormen in Nederland—Comments on the development of types of land 
division in the Netherlands, Boor en Spade—Drill and Spade, no. 5,1952) revealed 
that the historical types of land division found in the Netherlands must be regarded 
as a completely rational adaptation to the circumstances prevailing at the time of 
origin. 
J) The opinion expressed here differs from that of PETERSEN, who holds that a 
relatively weak tendency towards urbanism, and the rationalization which he 
regards as concomitant, can be attributed to the weight of influence of confessional 
church groups in public affairs in the Netherlands and—in consequence—to the 
deep significance of denominational education (PETERSEN, Planned Migration, 
particularly pp. 27-41). 
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directly. The presentday mentors of the "Gereformeerden" hold 
different ideas from D E COCK, and even from ABRAHAM KUYPER, the 
men who gave original form to their worship. The farmers and even 
the priests in old-time Kempenland, as described by BARENTSEN, held 
different views on church and religious matters from those who found, 
or find, a mouthpiece in a radical Roman Catholic periodical like Te 
Elfder Ure, (the Eleventh Hour). Their ideas on temporal matters 
have little in common1). 
No one, then, really assumes that the orthodox religious groups are 
still enmeshed in genuine traditionalistic thought. However, one often 
still hears the opinion expressed—even by those directly concerned— 
that traditionalism is more deeply rooted in the orthodox groups than 
in others. It is doubtful whether this, in its generality, is true. Research 
already conducted over a series of years by the department of Sociology 
and Sociography of the Agricultural University of the Netherlands 
into the incidence of traditionalistic and modern-dynamic patterns of 
culture among the rural population has repeatedly led to the con-
clusion that the "Gereformeerden" in general, for example, have 
largely accepted modern-dynamic thought and, as a rule, appear to 
be 'modern'. This applies not only to business—which MAX WEBER 
could perhaps help to explain—but also to their general behaviour. 
That they shun certain things accepted by other groups does not 
detract from the fact that they are, in general, amenable to change. 
Something similar is true of the Roman Catholics. It is definitely 
not the case that where there is a mixed population in a given area 
the Roman Catholics show up as particularly traditionalistic. In some 
cases, rather the reverse is true; we shall revert to this later. 
Even the religious views of the ultra-orthodox pietistic groups in 
the Dutch Reformed Church are apparently not incompatible, in 
principle, with a certain degree of modern-dynamic thought. It would 
seem that the fact, that members of this section of the Dutch Reformed 
Church often appear to think along strictly traditionalistic lines, must 
be attributed less to their religious beliefs as such than to their position 
as a small separate sub-group. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the observations on the de-
velopment of the modern mentality have been, as a rule, very general 
x) BARENTSEN, Het oude Kempenland. Books like that by SCHIPPEUS (R. SCHIP-
PERS, De gereformeerde %ede- "Gereformeerde Usage", 2nd edition, 1955) indicate 
clearly to what a very limited extent nowadays the pattern of thought among the 
"Gereformeerden" can still be considered traditionalistic. 
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in character and have done little to make it clear that within a given, 
large social unit—a nation for example---considerable differences may 
occur as regards the time at which, and the degree to which, modern-
dynamic thought pervades various groups. As already indicated, 
modern thought is rather slow in travelling from the higher strata of 
the community to the lower ones while, comparison of regions shows 
that one area accepts this pattern of thought earlier than another. Nor 
only is a given population group composed of various social strata, 
but the degree of social isolation—whether or not this is connected 
with geographical isolation—appears to play an important role. 
Returning to the problem of the declining birth rate, it should be 
pointed out that the assumption of a connection between the ex-
pansion of modern-dynamic thought and the decline of the birth rate 
is natural. The transition from a reproductive system where the ulti-
mate size of the family was left more or less in nature's hands to a 
system where the number of children per family is deliberately con-
trolled—irrespective of the means or methods employed—represents 
an important change in the behaviour of the individuals concerned. 
It is hard to imagine that this stage would be reached if a considerable 
breach had not been made in the bastions of traditionalistic thought. 
It is, of course, possible to conceive of a tradition characterized by 
limitation of the number of children but, in fact, in the Netherlands 
we were concerned with a system in which this was not the case, and 
its abandonment implies a significant break with tradition which it is 
difficult to assume was an isolated occurence. 
There were, of course, external material circumstances which served 
to advance birth control. We have already observed that this applies 
to the decline of the mortality rate. Further, lack of opportunities for 
economic advancement combined with poverty and unemployment, 
are in themselves forces that can be expected to promote birth control 
and, under certain circumstances, they do indeed do so. But the history 
of the previous century has demonstrated that these factors do not 
bring about a birth rate decline unless other, apparendy more funda-
mental, conditions have been fulfilled. There must be an inward 
readiness to accept limitation of the number of children, and a sine 
qua non for that is, logically, that in general a readiness is displayed 
to adopt a more or less positive attitude towards change. On the 
other hand it should be pointed out, as was already noted in passing, 
that the inward acceptance of a readiness to change in no way implies 
that everyone displaying such readiness accepts the same change. For 
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each individual and for each group, even though all are equally ready, 
in principle, to accept change, the acceptability of each concrete change 
is nevertheless dependent upon circumstances, especially the values 
obtaining in the group or individual, the social situation, and the 
material relationships peculiar to the environment. We may put it in 
this way, that as a consequence of the acceptance of the modern dy-
namic pattern of culture an interplay of factors was set in motion— 
factors already present but partially inactive—which led to a decline 
in the birth rate varying in time and extent from group to group and 
from region to region. Thus, for example, various existing religions 
could only begin to make their influence felt in the growing interplay 
of factors after the modern-dynamic pattern of culture had been ac-
cepted. In general, however, once a break-through had been made in 
traditionalistic thought in different parts of the country and among 
various social groups, the decline was considerable, and this may pre-
sumably be primarily attributed to the marked effect of the decline in 
the mortality rate. 
If the interpretative hypothesis formulated above is correct, it im-
plies in the first place that the development of the modern pattern of 
culture in the Netherlands actually started in the north and west and 
gradually progressed southeastwards. It goes without saying that it is 
not easy to demonstrate exactly the probability of this development 
on the basis of statistically measurable quantities that can be related to 
the growth of the modern-dynamic pattern of culture. What will be-
come apparent in the next part of this article, however,—as already 
pointed out incidentally in another connection—is that the regional 
diversity in the mortality decline points the same way. There may 
be other potential sources of numerical data which could support the 
theory just put forward but within the restricted framework of the 
present investigation they have not yet been explored. There is, how-
ever, an abundance of historical, pre-sociographic and sociographic 
material that, in my opinion, serves to confirm the general accuracy of 
the supposition. It is generally accepted—and the last generation ac-
tually experienced this—that the 19th century modernization of the 
Netherlands started in the west and north and only later affected the 
south and east. Various social causes may be indicated. As regards the 
west of the country, the early and intensive urbanization which occur-
red there was certainly a factor of significance, but we should bear in 
mind that it is doubrful whether the cultural development of the rural 
areas is always promoted when the influence of the town becomes too 
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powerful or too direct. There are signs that in the highly urbanized 
province of South Holland, for example, the modern pattern of culture 
spread rather more slowly than in the peninsula of North Holland 
precisely because of the considerable influence of the city1). Further, 
it should be pointed out that for the first 75 years of the 19th century 
the towns in the west and, for that matter, in the rest of the country 
as well, led anything but a flourishing existence and their cultural in-
fluence was presumably on a modest scale. 
What is also important, presumably, is that quite early on, partly 
because of geographical circumstances, agriculture showed a relatively 
high degree of specialization in the west and north of the Netherlands, 
with the emphasis falling either on arable farming or on cattle-breeding. 
In consequence of this, for centuries the agricultural industry had al-
ready been quite deeply involved in the market and money economy. 
This, combined with the good communications obtaining in both the 
west and the north because of the many waterways, meant that the 
rural popularion there had, of old, far more contact with the outside 
world that the inhabitants of the largely self-supporting, highly-iso-
lated rural areas of the east and south. For many of the towns in the 
provinces of North and South Holland, but also for much of the actual 
countryside, this contact with the outside world was considerably 
increased by participation in ocean navigation. 
In the peninsula of North Holland the influence of shipping ex-
tended far into the interior. But the same also applies to Groningen 
and Friesland, although possibly to a lesser extent. As regards the 
rural areas, we should also bear in mind that the west and particularly 
the north—as opposed to the east and the south—were characterized 
by farms that were large by Dutch standards. Because of this, a class 
of comparatively rich, sometimes very prosperous, farmers came into 
existence there, many of whom had the necessary education to partic-
ipate in the intellectual developments of their day. 
Be that as it may, it is obvious that, as early as the end of the 18th 
century, a change in thought was gaining ground in the west of the 
country, a change demonstrated amongst other things by a great inter-
est in Rationalism and the Enlightenment. Because of the way domestic 
*) According to an unpublished study by A. J. WICHERS. In his (unpublished) 
thesis: Het oude consumptiemelkersgebied rondom de stad Groningen (The former liquid 
milk dairy-farming belt around the town of Groningen) 1955, J. G. BAKKER 
demonstrated how the immediate proximity of a town and continual contact with 
the townspeople can act as a check to the modernization of thought and action. 
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history is taught in the Netherlands, it is less commonly known that 
in the north—more or less independently of the west, apparently— 
another centre of the dissemination of the modern-dynamic pattern of 
culture developed. Elsewhere x), I have tried to illustrate how rapidly 
and early modern ideas developed among the farmers of the clay-soil 
areas in Groningen. This would need to be confirmed by further study 
but, in line with what has already been pointed out, one gains the 
impression that in the north of the country the towns were certainly 
not in the forefront of the development of modern ideas, even though, 
for purely technical reasons, the sources whence the new ideas were 
drawn in the first instance must have reached the rural areas via the 
towns. The new conceptions, however, appear to have met with 
wider response in the country than in the town. To the best of my 
knowledge there is no study which systematically outlines the spread 
of the new ideas in the west of the country. We must assume, however, 
that they developed relatively early and quickly in the peninsula of 
North Holland. This is indicated quite clearly, for instance, by the 
foundation of the Society for Public Welfare (Maatschappij tot Nut 
van het Algemeen) in this part of the country, with the early establish-
ment of branches in various villages in the peninsula. For many years 
the "Nut"—as it is mostly called—was almost a symbol for everything 
that was modern and liberal. As regards Zeeland, Bouman's book on 
the history of agriculture in Zeeland2) helps to confirm the impression 
that there too, as early as the beginning of the 19th century, a definite 
intellectual change could be observed. 
Altogether, we may take it that by about the middle of the last 
century in the west and north of the country, including the rural areas 
—and to some extdht, perhaps, especially in the rural areas—modern-
dynamic thought had deeply permeated large sectors of the population. 
When, in the decades following, mainly as a result of the decline of the 
mortality rate, reproduction and size of family came to be regarded in 
a different light, there was already so much willingness to accept the 
new pattern of behaviour because of this, that a change in the repro-
ductive pattern involving a tendency towards deliberate limitation of 
the number of children per marriage, did not clash with any inward 
resistence to change in general. 
*) E. W. HOFSTEE, Het Oldambt, part 1, 1937. 
2) P. J. BOUMAN, Gescbiedenis van den Zeeuwschen landbouw in de Vide en 20ste eeutv 
en van de Zeeuwsche Landbouw Maatschappij (History of Agriculture in Zeeland in the 
19th and 20th century and of the Agricultural Company of Zeeland) 1854-1943, 
1946. 
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The situation was quite different in the east and south of the country, 
including the sandy-soil districts in Groningen and Friesland and the 
river-clay areas in Gelderland. About 1840, three gentlemen, who called 
themselves 'the three podagrists', undertook a series of expeditions on 
foot in the province of Drenthe, and anyone reading what they have to 
say about the farmers of Drenthe and the countryside there in those 
days *) will find it hard to believe that these farmers, whose lives were 
still conducted entirely on traditionalistic lines, lived only about 65 
miles from the farmers of Groningen described by J. F. ZIJLKER in 
1843 2), who were already largely caught up in the modernization 
process. PRAKKE, in his "Deining in Drenthe" (Unrest in Drenthe) 3), 
has written a gripping account of how traditional Drenthe society 
continued to oppose modernizing 'western' influence all through the 
19th century. Pre-sociographic literature on the sandy-soil areas of 
Gelderland and Overyssel shows us a similar picture of an agrarian 
society clinging to tradition for the most part until far into the 19th 
century. It is only towards the end of that century that the first symp-
toms of incipient change could be recorded, change which, within a 
short time, would radically transform the character of society there. 
Undoubtedly, the traditionalistic pattern of culture was maintained 
longest in the sandy-soil area of East Brabant and North Limburg. 
BARENTSEN'S book on old Kempenland 4), which is based on his ex-
periences as a doctor, in this region at the beginning of the present 
century, reveals a society still barely touched by change, and drawing 
almost exclusively on the past for its criteria of contemporary behaviour. 
Brabant's position with regard to cultural developments is particu-
larly interesting. Presumably the greater part of this province remained 
longer aloof from the developments taking place in the country as a 
whole, and throughout the entire western world, than any other part 
of the Netherlands. It long maintained a somewhat defensive attitude 
towards "Holland" which to the people of North Brabant and Limburg 
means all parts of the Netherlands north of the river Meuse. This at-
titude should perhaps be attributed to its former status as conquered 
territory governed by the States General rather than to its closed Ro-
man Catholic character, although the one undoubtedly lent force to 
x) Het boek der Podagristen (The book of the Podagrists), Bloemlezing (Antholo-
gy), 1947. 
2) J. F. ZIJLKER, De Groninger Landbouwer en zj/n va& (The Groningen farmer 
and his vocation), 1843. 
s) H. J. PRAKKE, Deining in Drenthe, (Unrest in Drenthe) 1951. 
4) Het Oude Kempenland. 
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the other1). In contrast to various other Roman Catholic border areas, 
such as Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and parts of South Limburg, it was sepa-
rated by a scarcely-populated and largely uncultivated district from 
important Belgian cultural centres. Therefore it had little cultural 
contact with the outside world from the south either, which helped 
the greater part of Brabant to retain its original character for a long 
time. 
This does not apply to the west of Brabant that had long formed the 
thoroughfare between North and South Holland and Antwerp and 
Brussels and was therefore continually exposed to cultural influences 
from both north and south. Because of this, the modern pattern of 
culture made earlier and more rapid progress there than in central or 
—even more—in eastern Brabant. 
It is only in recent decades that the situation has altered, but the 
change has been rapid. Nowadays we can hardly talk of any delay in 
the development of the modern pattern of culture in Brabant except, 
perhaps, in the case of a few small areas in the east. We may ask our-
selves is this a question of outside influences having a considerale 
effect at long last, or is it due to internal development, although the 
latter, of course, is not independent of general cultural trends in the 
Netherlands themselves and in the western world as a whole. It seems 
to me that there is much to be said for the latter point of view. Bra-
bant seems to be gradually becoming a culture-spreading area in its 
own right, just as North and South Holland were of old, and the north 
of the country, too, to a lesser extent. 
For a long time, the areas on the eastern periphery of Gelderland 
and Overyssel were in a similar position to Brabant—although histo-
rical-political factors possibly played a less significant role. Far from 
the culture-spreading areas in the north and west, and having no 
contact with any important cultural centres across the frontier, they, 
x) During the existence of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, that 
is to say from 1579-1795, the present-day provinces of North Brabant and Limburg 
did not form part of this Republic as such. They were not included in the Union 
of Utrecht of 1579, on which the Republic was based, because at that time they 
were still under Spanish rule. Later on these territories were conquered by the 
Republic. They were not then granted the status of autonomous provinces, how-
ever, but were governed direct as conquered territories by the States General of 
the Republic. Although the Counter-Reformation, had meanwhile led to the 
Roman Catholic Church becoming firmly re-established in these parts, and al-
though virtually the entire population belonged to this church, it was not formally 
recognized and in these territories, for example, Roman Catholics were forbidden 
to hold public office. 
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too, were affected comparatively late by modern developments. 
As has been said, North Limburg, or at least North Limburg west 
of the Meuse, identifies closely with North Brabant. Limburg east of 
the Meuse, including South Limburg, has always been pretty strongly 
influenced by the Lower Rhine area, and South Limburg by Wallonian 
Belgium as well. This probably resulted in the modern-dynamic pattern 
of culture reaching Limburg east of the Meuse earlier, on the whole, 
than it reached the east of Brabant, even though the position of Lim-
burg, in relation to the culture-spreading areas of North and South 
Holland, was even more peripheral than that of Brabant. The pattern 
of the fertility trends in Limburg east of the Meuse also differs some-
what from that in Brabant. 
The general outline of the historical progress of the modern pattern 
of culture in the Netherlands in its regional aspects, therefore, makes 
the hypothesis of a connection between the development of this pattern 
of culture and the progress of the modern birth rate decline extremely 
acceptable, although, of course, much research would be necessary 
before this hypothesis could be confirmed in detail as well. 
What makes the hypothesis attractive is that it leaves plenty of room 
for the introduction of all sorts of special explanatory factors which 
may help to make particular aspects of the trend in certain groups 
comprehensible. We have already pointed out that it is quite compati-
ble with the assumption that certain religious views have either a re-
tarding or an accelerating effect, although in practice such influence 
does not seem to be of decisive importance. 
The comparatively rapid progress—after a hesitant start—of the 
urban birth rate decline also fits this theory perfecdy. After all, in the 
towns, once the modern pattern of culture had obtained a firm footing 
among certain strata of the population, the nature of the urban com-
munity meant that it could pervade the strata in question more rapidly 
than in rural area. Again, the relatively strong non-churchgoing trend 
in the towns possibly promoted the rapidity of the birth rate decline. 
On the basis of this hypothesis it is also perfectly comprehensible 
that the birth rate decline should start at the top of the social ladder 
and only gradually spread to the lower groups of the social hierarchy. 
Because the modern-dynamic pattern of culture was relatively late in 
penetrating these lower population groups, the proletarian intermediate 
stage occurred between the agrarian-artisan pattern and that of modern 
reproduction, when large numbers of workers experienced a loss of 
social security as a result of the growth of capitalism and there was no 
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Source: Agricultural University, Wagenlngen, Department of Rural 
Sociology 
Map 6 
Average crude birth-rates in Dutch municipalities, 1891-1895. 
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longer any point in trying to make certain of a good livelihood in the 
future by marrying late or not al all. 
In connection with the question of a link between the development 
of the modern-dynamic pattern of culture, economic developments and 
the progress of the decline in fertility, it is perhaps desirable to discuss 
in rather more detail the wave of rising birth rates preceding the 
fertility decline. As indicated above and contended elsewhere1), the 
national statistics for the period 1850-1875 only faintly reflect the 
significance of the influence of the proletarian intermediate stage on 
the temporary rise in the birth rate in the second half of the 19th 
century. There are such considerable phase differences in the develop-
ment of this rise and subsequent decline in the various parts of the 
country that, in the latter half of the 19th century, they largely cancel 
each other out as far as the country as a whole is concerned. If the 
trend in each of the various areas is investigated separately, however, 
it becomes quite clear that, generally speaking, in places where in 
1850 the birth rate was still low, the waves of rising and declining 
fertility follow each other in regular succession, so to speak. This can 
be seen to some extent on the coloured maps reproduced here, but 
comparison of the cartograms of the 5-yearly averages of birth rates 
per municipality since 1850, which were at my disposal when under-
taking this research, makes it even more apparent. It was not possible 
to publish all this cartographic material but, to illustrate the point, 
the map relating to the birth rate in the period 1891-1895 (map 6) has 
been reprinted here. This shows, among other things, quite a high 
birth rate for the west of Brabant2) which a few decades earlier was 
still characterized by relatively low figures in this respect, whereas the 
figures for the eastern part of this province are, generally speaking, 
still low. Comparing maps 5 and 6 for the country as a whole, we are 
struck by the fact that practically the very same area that was re-
markable in the early nineties for a late rise in the birth rate is conspicu-
ous a quarter of a century later for lagging behind in the decline. In 
general, it seems that the rise preceding the decline follows practically 
the same course as the decline itself, apparently shifting from north-
west to southeast. In the case of the rise of the birth rate, of course, 
the movement for the country as a whole can be less clearly demon-
strated than in the case of the decline because by about 1850 a large 
part of the country was already characterized by high birth rates. But 
x) HOFSTEE, 'Regionale verscheidenheid ... etc.'. 
2) See the maps in HOFSTEE'S 'Regionale verscheidenheid ... etc.'. 
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in North Brabant, for example, the gradual shifting of the high birth 
rates from west to east preceding the later decline along the same 
lines, as illustrated by the data just mentioned, is very plain to see. In 
the east of the country and in the sandy-soil districts of Groningen 
and Friesland, various areas characterized by a delayed birth rate 
decline also clearly demonstrate this gradual rise of the birth rate in 
the second half of the 19th century, preceding the decline. 
We may perhaps wonder whether this succession of rise and decline 
is not also connected with the growth and ultimate abatement of the 
great agricultural crisis at the end of last century. In the sandy soil 
districts in particular, the crisis was followed by a period of rapid 
development of small farms, resulting in an increase in the number of 
sources of livelihood. There is no doubt that the trend of economic 
developments considerably influenced population developments 
during the second half of the 19th century in the then highly agrarian 
Netherlands. The temporary decline, after 1875, in the percentage of 
married women aged 15-44 (see table 5) which reduced national 
averages to a very low level in the period 1891-1895, must be attribut-
ed, as has already been pointed out, to bad economic conditions in 
farming, resulting from the great agricultural crisis. Certainly, the 
particularly rapid decline in marital fertility which set in after 1875 
(see table 6) in the provinces of Groningen, Friesland and Zeeland 
especially, may also be connected in part with the agricultural crisis. 
It is striking, too, that in the ten years following the period of lowest 
ebb in 1891-1895, the 'rural' provinces record a definite increase in the 
percentage of married women, whereas in the more highly urbanized 
provinces this percentage remains at approximately the same level. 
Yet it is by no means the case that economic developments in 
agriculture were to play a decisive role in shaping fertility trends in 
the Netherlands as a whole. The shift from northwest to southeast, 
first of the natality increase, then of the decline, actually proceeds 
independently of the general economic situation in agriculture. The 
latter only causes, in the one case, a temporary slow-down and, in the 
other, a temporary acceleration of the movement already in progress. 
In the western and northern provinces, the decline in the birth rate 
which started about 1875 continues after 1895, although in the highly 
agrarian provinces such as Zeeland and Groningen, there is a tempo-
rary slackening-off in the decline after this date. In the eastern and 
southern provinces, however, birth rates return to the pre-crisis level 
after 1895, and around the turn of the century the level in North 
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Brabant and Limburg is actually higher than ever before. If we 
compare cartograms of the birth rate per municipality for the period 
1876-1880 with those for the period 1891-1895, then, in spite of a 
somewhat lower level generally in the east and south, the area of 
higher fertility can be seen to be spreading to the southeast while, on 
the other hand, in the west and north the fertility decline has apparent-
ly set in in full force. 
So although the answer to the question as to the origin of the 
successive waves of high and low birth rates cannot be found in the 
fluctuations o£ the general economic situation, and although the 
hypothesis of a connection between the trend of the birth rate decline 
and the regional development of the modern-dynamic pattern of 
culture can be fully upheld, the foregoing observations do not provide 
a complete answer to the question to which I have addressed myself 
elsewhere1) as to the origin of the rising birth rate in the rural areas 
in the east and south prior to the birth rate decline. In the north and 
west, as has already been pointed out, the origin of a high birth rate 
in country areas is easily accounted for on the basis of the hypotheses 
advanced, as well as on the basis of special factors such as the re-
markably high mortality including infant mortality in the west of the 
country2) about 1850 and for some decades afterwards. Generally 
speaking, in the north and west we have to deal with a fairly extensive 
class of agricultural labourers. An important aspect of the penetration 
of modern-dynamic patterns of thought among the farming group 
was the genesis of a capitalistic mentality and the development of 
management along capitalistic lines in agriculture. This meant that 
the agricultural labourers' group became largely proletarianized and 
this, in turn, accounts for the rise of the marital and reproductive 
pattern typical of the proletarian intermediate stage, and the increased 
fertility associated with it. This explanation, however, does not auto-
matically suffice for the sandy-soil areas in the east and south where, 
generally speaking, farming was, and still is, practised on small family 
holdings without hired workers. Outside labour, if any, was provided 
mostly by the sons of farmers working for other farmers as farmhands. 
So we can hardly talk here of the proletarianization of an agricultural 
labourers' group. How, then, can the development of a high birth rate 
x) HOFSTEE, 'Regionale verscheidenheid ... etc.' and 'De landboirw en de 
migratie'. 
a) For the influence of the high mortality rates on fertility rates in the West see 
HOFSTEE, 'Regionale verscheidenheid ... etc.'. 
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and, in particular, the gradual shifting of this to the southeast be 
explained? 
In the first place it should be pointed out that, as opposed to the 
-west and north, the towns and the more or less industrialized areas in 
the south and east in general have an appreciable start over the 
agrarian countryside as regards the development of both the high 
birth rates and their subsequent decline. As a rule, in the second half 
of the 19th century, compared with their surroundings, places like 
Bergen op Zoom, Roosendaal, Tilburg, 's-Hertogenbosch, Oss, 
Eindhoven, Helmond, Nymegen, Arnhem, Winterswyk, Enschede, 
Hengelo and Almelo, and also the industrial area along the banks of 
the Old Yssel, first record distinctly higher birth rates and then 
subsequently head the decline too. Thus it is also clearly demonstrated 
that, in contrast to the west and north, the social structure of the 
countryside rendered it less liable than the towns to proletarianization 
and, accordingly, to the development of a temporarily higher birth rate. 
Various 'technical' reasons may be advanced for the fact that the 
countryside did ultimately participate in the higher birth rate trend. 
In the first place, more and more rural municipalities became involved 
in some measure in the industrialization process because, to an in-
creasing extent, textile and various other industries attracted com-
muting workers from the agricultural districts around. This meant 
that it became less and less necessary for children from the agrarian 
milieu to remain on the farms unmarried, while the lowering of the 
marital age also led to increased marital fertility. 
In the second place, the technological developments affecting 
farming since the end of the 19th century led to a rapid increase in the 
number of opportunities for making a living, particularly in the sandy-
soil areas, so that a larger number of farmers' sons was able to find a 
livelihood as farmers and could thus afford not only to marry but to 
marry earlier. In the third place, in consequence of the growth of 
industry and the increasing opportunities for employment outside 
agriculture in general, more and more countrymen migrated to the 
towns. This meant fewer unmarried adults on the farms and a conse-
quent reduction in the pressure exerted on the birth rate by the high 
percentage of single persons. Finally, the increased prosperity of the 
rural areas made people want to provide more adequately for them-
selves. As a result, the retail professions offered new scope to the sons 
of farmers, involving new opportunities for marrying and raising a 
family. 
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Underlying these technical reasons, however, are other causes, 
which have their origin in the pattern of culture peculiar to the 
population. When a farmer or a farmer's son changes over to industry 
—particularly if migration is involved—it implies a social transition, 
and a great deal of resolution is required to take this step. It is fairly 
common knowledge that the rural population frequently experiences 
considerable inward resistence to such changes. Something similar 
applies to the adoption of new farming methods, a prerequisite for 
which is also an inner readiness to take the first step1). In short, the 
degree to which advantage was taken of the economic opportunities 
arising—opportunities which might form the basis of an increased 
birth rate—depended upon the extent to which the modern-dynamic 
pattern of culture pervaded rural areas in the sandy-soil regions. It 
therefore becomes comprehensible—in respect of the sandy-soil 
regions as well—that the trend towards rising birth rates, as the first 
demographic expression of the penetration of the modern-dynamic 
pattern of culture, proceeded along the same lines as the subsequent 
birth rate decline; this being the next consequence of the adoption of 
this pattern of culture. 
Summarizing the foregoing, we arrive at the conclusion that the 
progress of the modern birth rate decline in the Netherlands, since 
about 1880 in particular, has been primarily governed, in its regional 
development, by the degree to which, and time at which, the modern-
dynamic pattern of culture has pervaded the various parts of the 
country. Since it is also the rapidity with which this modern pattern 
of culture has penetrated the various social groups that has determined 
the differences in fertility trends in the various social strata in the first 
place, the decline in fertility as a whole during this period has been 
most closely bound up with the growdi of this change in our society's 
pattern of culture, even though other influences have also undoubtedly 
been at work. 
One may perhaps ask what connection there is between the de-
velopment outlined and the position—somewhat exceptional in the 
western world—which has long been occupied by the Netherlands on 
account of its birth rate level. Within the framework of this article, no 
detailed comparison has been made between trends in the Netherlands 
and in other countries. It should be remembered, however, that VAN 
x) See various publications of the Dept. of Sociology and Sociography of the 
Agricultural University of the Netherlands. 
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HEEK1) has already established that if the non-Catholic birth rate in 
the Netherlands is compared with that of such countries as Denmark 
and Norway, which closely resemble the Netherlands socially and 
economically, there is little unusual about the Netherlands. In the 
foregoing we have tried to make it clear that the slower birth rate 
decline which is common to Roman Catholic as a whole is actually 
only connected to a limited extent with the Roman Catholic faith as 
such, and must be regarded, in the first place, as a consequence of the 
later penetration of the modern pattern of culture in the Roman 
Catholic sandy-soil districts in the southeast of the Netherlands. 
Without denying the importance of the other factors advanced by 
VAN HEEK, I believe that the fact that the birth rate of the Dutch 
Roman Catholics (and with it that of the Netherlands as a whole) has 
remained high for so long must be attributed primarily to the situation 
brought about by the status of States General dependencies and the 
isolated position occupied by a large part of North Brabant and parts 
of Limburg in respect of foreign centres of culture. To this may be 
added, that the remarkable economic-geographical structure of the 
Netherlands has resulted in the country's economic and cultural life, 
both during and long after the days of the Republic, being centred 
very largely in the west and partly in the north. This has meant that 
for a long time, the sandy soil regions in the east and south were, 
generally speaking, only relatively slightly affected by the changes in 
the pattern of culture in the western world. 
But the process of penetration of the modern pattern of culture is 
progressively losing its predominating significance in furthering the 
decline of the birth rate. This does not mean that dynamic thought has 
found acceptance everywhere, or with everyone, to the same degree. 
Research has shown that this is not the case. It determines differences 
in the pattern of behaviour of groups as a whole, however, less and 
less. Everywhere modern thought is becoming increasingly normative. 
As regards the birth rate trend, this means that in the various parts of 
the country and the various social groups a levelling process is talcing 
place on a steadily increasing scale. In many respects, presumably, the 
continuing influence of the modern pattern of culture will lead to 
*) Het geboorte-niveau der Nederlandse Rooms-Katholieken, especially the English 
summary, p. 190. It should be pointed out, however, that the province of Gronin-
gen, which VAN HEEK compares with Jutland, is not typical of the non-Catholic 
parts of the Netherlands. In Groningen special forces are at work, causing the 
birth rate there to fall to a strikingly low level. The comparison of the towns is 
more convincing (see VAN HEEK, p. 37). 
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further equalization. As regards regional differences, fertility in North 
Brabant, particularly in the east of this province, may be expected to 
decline still more compared with other parts of the country, even 
though the birth rate in North Brabant may remain relatively high for 
a long time yet, because the province has a considerable "reserve" in 
its relatively low percentage of married women and high percentage 
of juveniles. 
We are now at the beginning of a new period in the demographic 
history of the Netherlands, a period in which the differences between 
the various regional and social groups will probably be relatively 
small, and such differences as there are will presumably be due to 
factors which were only of secondary importance during the previous 
period or which carried no weight at all at that time. This may mean 
that differences in nuptiality—which were still of prime influence on 
the pattern of fertility a century ago but then became relatively less 
important in consequence of the steadily greater significance of the 
differences in marital fertility—may become of relatively greater 
significance in the future again as a factor accounting for differences 
in the birth rates. 
We may perhaps wonder what will be the significance, in the near 
future, of the differences in marital fertility between the various re-
ligious groups. Although the significance of the religious differences, 
in themselves, as a cause of the variations in marital fertility have 
probably been overestimated in the past, it cannot be denied that in 
some Roman Catholic areas, for example, the birth rate decline set in 
early and at first proceeded just as fast as in other population groups, 
but slowed down later so that the birth rate there today is above that 
of other places in the neighbourhood. This clearly applies to West 
Friesland, for instance, but also to various other areas. We have al-
ready pointed out, however, that as far as the countryside is concerned 
this phenomenon seems to be mainly restricted to horticultural areas. 
Without further research, it is difficult to account for this higher birth 
rate among the Roman Catholic population group in old-established 
areas of decline. It cannot be said off-hand, for example, what part is 
played here by the reasons VAN HEEK puts forward for the higher 
Roman Catholic birth rate. Miss DIELS1) found that Roman Catholic 
girls on the verge of marriage are more attracted by the idea of a large 
*) A. E. DIELS, Opvattingen van ondertrouwde vrouwn omtrent de grootte van baar toe-
komstig ge^jn (Views of women about to be married on the size of their future 
families), Part I (1951) and Part II (1953). 
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family than non-Catholics, -whether or not birth control is considered 
morally permissible. 
It is uncertain, however, whether this is the expression of a more 
or less fixed attitude or the after-effects of past conditions and of the 
teachings of the church as experienced in youth. It is worth noting 
that an enquiry among students at the University of Wageningen1) 
revealed that, in contrast to the other religious groups, the Roman 
Catholics wanted decidedly smaller families than those of their parents. 
For the time being, Roman Catholic birth rates will probably remain 
a little higher than those of non-Catholics. On the other hand, it does 
seem likely that the differences in the national figures will become 
smaller than they are at present, if only because of the further relative 
decline in fertility which is to be expected in eastern North Brabant. 
It is perhaps also important to ask ourselves what effect the tendency 
towards non-churchgoing (which is likely to increase) will have upon 
the birth rate. Previous analysis taught us that two areas where this 
tendency is particularly pronounced in rural districts, namely, north-
east Groningen and, to a lesser degree, southeast Friesland, are 
characterized by conspicuously low birth rates, while in the large 
towns there is also a connection between non-churchgoing and a low 
birth rate. In other areas, however, there is little evidence of a relation-
ship between non-churchgoing and a particularly low birth rate. The 
situation in southeast Friesland and northeast Groningen—and, one 
may add, in a city like Amsterdam—leads to the conclusion that 
considerable birth rate decline, pronounced non-churchgoing and 
political radicalization are—all three—consequences of the same 
phenomenon, namely early, widespread, and intensive proletarianiza-
tion of the working class. The more far-reaching the proletarianiza-
tion, the more fiercely the worker rejects the past when he becomes 
conscious of his own situation and begins to see a change of changing 
and improving it. To that past belongs the birth rate pattern of the 
proletarian intermediate stage; while he sees in family limitation a 
chance to improve his lot. 
VAN HEEK points out that the fertility trend in a country that was 
late in its industrialization, like the Netherlands, cannot be compared 
with the trend in a country like Great Britain, for instance, that was 
industrialized early. But is it primarily a question of industrialization 
*) J. I. NANNINGA and M. M. ZIJLSTRA, Onder%pek naar positie en hvensorde van 
een aantal Nederlandse gezinnen (Research on the position and living patterns of a 
number of Dutch families), 1960 (unpublished). 
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as such, or of proletarianization? The difference is not just formal. 
Firstly, proletarianization occurred in rural areas as well as urban ones 
and, secondly, proletarianization is not a matter of social-economic 
relationships alone, but also of mental ones. In some cases, such as the 
proletarianization of the agricultural labourers in Groningen, the 
mental aspect was presumably the more important1). Among the 
members of the upper stratum of the population in both town and 
country, the development of the modern pattern of culture gave rise 
to conceptions and ideas which increasingly alienated them from the 
lower strata, whose members continued to feel and think as they had 
always done2). Moreover, the new ideas provided fertile soil for the 
economic liberalism which justified the entrepreneurs in pursuing 
their own interests even if this was to the detriment of the workers. 
It is worth noting that in the sandy-soil regions where industrialization 
set in early (Brabant and "Twente"), relations between employer and 
employee remained closer and less business-like: in other words, 
proletarianization as a mental phenomenon had much less effect there 
than in various parts of the west and north. It is an obvious assump-
tion that this should be attributed to the late penetration of the 
modern-dynamic pattern of culture. 
If the assumption made in the foregoing, is correct, we need not 
expect a gradually-progressing separation from the churches to go 
hand-in-hand with a conspicuous intensification of the birth rate 
decline. Any further separation from the churches could no longer be 
regarded as a reaction to the intensive proletarianization outlined 
above, as this now really belongs to the past. Nor, for the same 
reasons, is it to be expected that the rapid industrialization which is 
currently taking place in the Netherlands will have the same effect 
upon the birth rate as that which VAN HEEK ascribes to industrializa-
tion in Great Britain. 
As far as the country as a whole is concerned, a relatively high 
birth rate in the immediate future already seems probable on the basis 
of our age structure alone, although the differences with the rest of 
the western world, presumably, will not be very marked. In the long 
run, however, we may expect an acceleration of the very gradual 
l) HOFSTEE, Oldambt. 
*) This can be clearly demonstrated for Northern Groningen. See HOFSTEE, 
Oldambt, including the quotations from the Handdingen (Proceedings) of the 
Groningen Mij. van Landbouw (Groningen Agricultural Company) and its prede-
cessors. 
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decline now in progress1). At the moment, higher nuptiality compen-
sates for the manifest tendency of the marital fertility rate to fall. We 
have already referred to the particularly rapid rise in the percentage 
of married women in the post-war period. It does not seem likely 
that this increase will continue at its present pace. There is perhaps 
already some indication of this in the lower level of the number of 
marriages per 1,000 of the total population during 1959 and 1960 
compared with the foregoing years. Now undoubtedly, in a few years' 
time, the marriage rate and—other things being equal—the birth rate 
likewise, will rise again as the 'bulge' babies of the immediate post-war 
years reach marriageable age. In all probability this will put a tempo-
rary stop to further decline of the birth rate. Once the influence of the 
'bulge' on nuptiality is exhausted, however, and if the marriage rate 
stabilizes itself at a level somewhat below that of the first 10-15 years 
after the war, the decline in the marital fertility rate will assert itself 
more obviously than has been the case up to now. Moreover, the 
marital fertility rate itself will then probably be subject to an acceler-
ated decline. The percentage of young-marrieds will become relatively 
smaller so that, even if the number of children per completed marriage 
remains constant, marital fertility will be less. 
Of decisive importance for future developments, however, is the 
population's attitude towards the problems of marriage, family and 
reproduction. Just because the size of the family has now become a 
point of conscious deliberation in practically all marriages—or will 
certainly become so in the near future—it has become almost more 
important than ever for the sociologist to investigate the social factors 
influencing this attitude. 
3. THE TREND OF MORTALITY 
Newspapers and the radio make fairly regular reports on health 
conditions and the level of mortality in the Netherlands as compared 
with other countries. Therefore, presumably, most Dutch people are 
persuaded that this country is in a favourable position in this respect. 
The table below reproduces the mortality trend in the period just 
x) In the last few years this accelaration has in fact taken place. Particularly in 
1965 and the years since then there has been a sharp decline in the birth rate not-
withstanding the fact that the average nuptial age has steadily continued to decline, 
partly due, presumably, to the conditions of economic boom which have been in 
operation until recently. 
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Table 7 
Death-rates in the Netherlands, 1850-1959 (Five-yearly averages) 
Period 
1851-1855 
1856-1860 
1861-1865 
1866-1870 
1871-1875 
1876-1880 
1881-1885 
18864890 
1891-1895 
1896-1900 
1901-1905 
Av. death-rates 
24,7 
26,8 
24,9 
25,2 
25,5 
22,9 
21,4 
20,6 
19,6 
17,3 
16,1 
Period 
1906-1910 
1911-1915 
1916-1920 
1921-1925 
1926-1930 
1931-1935 
1936-1940 
1941-1945 
1946-1950 
1951-1955 
1956-1959 
Av. death-rates 
14,3 
12,7 
13,8 
10,4 
9,9 
8,9 
8,9 
11,3 
7,9 
7,5 
7,6 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics and Department of Rural Sociology, the 
Agricultural University, Wageningen. 
behind us and clearly illustrates how much more propitious the rates 
have become in a comparatively short space of time. 
We usually fail to realize that in the course of a lifetime our grand-
parents were confronted with death three or four times more often 
than we. It would be worthwile for sociologists and psychologists to 
try to find out how this change has affected man's attitude towards 
life and death and his state of mind in general. 
At the end of the section on fertility, I observed that research into 
the social factors affecting fertility is becoming highly important 
precisely because the level of fertility has become so much a matter of 
deliberate reflection. From this point of view, mortality is definitely 
less interesting to a sociologist than fertility. In discussing mortality, 
we may proceed on the assumption that man instinctively tends to 
prolong life as far as possible and only in exceptional cases deliber-
ately asks himself whether or not he shall go on living. Suicide may 
be an interesting sociological problem in itself, but from the point of 
view of total mortality it is of minor significance as a cause of death. 
In the Netherlands only about 1 death in 100 can be attributed—of-
ficially, at least—to suicide. The Dutch population's attitudes towards 
death are certainly not the same in all strata of the population, nor in 
all areas either—something well worth investigating—but this fact is 
presumably of little weight in accounting for the variety in death 
rates. We cannot assume that any such differences could lead to con-
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siderable diversity in the urge to continue living and the will to resist 
death1). 
Another reason why the mortality trend is less interesting to the 
sociologist than the trend in fertility is that the former has been so 
largely affected by the growth of medical science, at least during the 
last 100 years. Now, of course, the progress of science in general and 
of medical science in particular cannot be seen apart from social trends 
in the world as a whole. When dealing with the trend of the death 
rate in the Netherlands, the sociologist should actually take the 
standard of medical science as a datum. There is hardly any possibility 
of explaining special features of mortality in the Netherlands on the 
basis of any special characteristics of Dutch medical science due to the 
influence of social factors peculiar to the Netherlands. In the nature 
of things, this applies even more to the specific characteristics of 
mortality of various groups, regional and otherwise, in the Nether-
lands. 
Finally it should be pointed out that in the past, physical-geo-
graphical conditions have had a considerable effect upon the mortality 
level. Once again, this is a matter of factors outside the sociologist's 
range. At the present stage of development in western countries, the 
physical-geographical component hardly counts at all in the totality 
of causes determining the level of mortality, while in the so-called 
underdeveloped countries its influence becomes less every day. 
All this does not alter the fact that social influences are of con-
siderable significance as far as the level of mortality is concerned. 
Social factors largely assert their influence on mortality via the age 
structure of the population. The fact that the Netherlands as a whole 
has a remarkably low death rate can be attributed, in part, to the high 
expectation of life for all age groups, but another important factor is 
the existing age structure. Even the most propitious expectation of 
life cannot guarantee a low crude death rate unless the age structure 
makes this feasible. Although, in this respect, the nation's age struc-
ture is becoming less favourable—table 8 shows that as a result the 
*) It might be imagined that suicide is a manifestation of a relatively feeble 
urge to continue living common to much larger groups of the population, and 
also expressing itself amongst other things in a conscious or unconscious lowering 
of mental resistance to illness and other threats to life. Were this the case, one 
•would expect to find correlation between a high percentage of suicides and a 
relatively high mortality rate. Comparison of the regional rates for mortality and 
suicide in the Netherlands and, for that matter, in the various countries of the 
West, do not provide the slightest grounds for such an assumption. 
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Table 8 
Crude and standardised death-rates per 1,000 of the total population, 1938-1959 
Year 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1959 
1958 
Crude death-
Mi 
8,69 
8,80 
10,49 
10,47 
10,18 
10,61 
12,65 
18,30 
8,87 
8,41 
7,76 
8,41 
7,72 
7,83 
7,59 
8,02 
7,90 
8,08 
8,23 
8,00 
8,07 
8,22 
F 
8,37 
8,47 
9,28 
9,55 
8,85 
9,48 
10,92 
12,25 
8,14 
7,72 
7,03 
7,88 
7,23 
7,21 
7,05 
7,34 
7,04 
7,06 
7,29 
7,00 
6,98 
6,90 
rates 
Total 
8,53 
8,64 
9,88 
10,00 
9,51 
10,04 
11,78 
15,26 
8,50 
8,06 
7,39 
8,14 
7,47 
7,52 
7,42 
7,68 
7,47 
7,57 
7,76 
7,50 
7,52 
7,56 
Standardized death-rates* 
M 
8,51 
8,53 
10,15 
10,11 
9,97 
10,12 
11,99 
17,40 
8,09 
7,63 
6,98 
7,52 
6,81 
6,84 
6,52 
6,80 
6,59 
6,65 
6,71 
6,46 
6,45 
6,51 
F 
8,21 
8,20 
8,92 
9,17 
8,46 
9,00 
10,31 
11,50 
7,41 
6,93 
6,26 
6,91 
6,29 
6,19 
5,94 
6,10 
6,74 
5,65 
5,73 
5,43 
5,32 
5,17 
Total 
8,35 
8,36 
9,53 
9,64 
9,12 
9,56 
11,15 
14,44 
7,75 
7,28 
6,62 
7,21 
6,55 
6,52 
6,24 
6,45 
6,16 
6,15 
6,21 
5,95 
5,88 
6,84 
Source: C.B.S. 
* The Dutch population of 1936 is used as standard-population 
crude death rate is declining far less quickly than the standardized 
mortality rate, taking the age structure as it was in 1936 as a standard— 
compared with the surrounding countries the Netherlands is still in a 
highly favourable position. This situation is primarily due to a rela-
tively high birth rate in past decades, and to the fact that, in spite of 
increased emigration since the war, overseas migration in the past has 
been too low to affect the age structure unfavourably to any con-
siderable extent. Social factors determining birth rates were discussed 
in detail in the previous section. It was stated at the outset that 
overseas migration as such would not be discussed in this article. The 
circumstance that its influence as an explanatory factor of the mortality 
trend is slight, is all the more reason for dispensing with further 
discussion. 
But it is important to point out here—partly in connection with 
what will be discussed later—that as a result of internal migration the 
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Table 9 
Crude-and-standardized death-rates per 1,000 of the population of the Dutch provinces, 
1955-1956 
Province 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
Overijssel 
Gelderland 
Utrecht 
North-Holland 
South-Holland 
Zeeland 
North-Brabant 
Limburg 
Netherlands 
Crude 
death-rates 
8,39 
8.83 
6.90 
7.60 
7.74 
8.05 
8.10 
7.58 
8.88 
6.79 
6.93 
7.66 
Standardized 
death-rates* 
7.12 
7.21 
7.09 
7.84 
7.66 
7.84 
7.67 
7.40 
7.01 
8.21 
8.68 
7.66 
Source: C.B.S. 
* The Dutch population of 31 December 1955 is used as standard-population 
various areas of emigration in the Netherlands have acquired an un-
favourable age structure. Table 9 gives the crude and standardized 
mortality rates for the provinces for the year 1955-1956. The stand-
ardized mortality rates, show that the actual variations in the expec-
tation of life are quite different from what one might perhaps expect 
from looking only at the crude death rates. This is partly because the 
effect of internal migration—and other factors—on age structure con-
ceals the real picture of regional differences in mortality. 
But even if age structure is of considerable importance, the differ-
ences in expectation of life mentioned earlier still remain. It is a 
recognized fact that, in comparison with other nations, our country 
as a whole is remarkable for a high average expectation of life. Table 9, 
however, shows that the existing differences in mortality between the 
various parts of the Netherlands are by no means negligible. The 
standardized mortality rate in Limburg in 1955-1956, for example, 
was fully 20% higher than in the three northern provinces. 
As said before, it seems reasonable to proceed on the assumption 
that the will to survive is equally strong everywhere, while we may 
also take it that, theoretically, modern means of communication place 
medical knowledge and ability at the disposal of the whole world in 
the same degree. If we further assume that physical-geographical 
factors no longer play such an important part in determining the 
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mortality level—at least as far as the western world is concerned— 
then, leaving the population's age structure out of consideration, the 
mortality level will be determined by the population's general living 
conditions and the extent to which medical care and hygiene—as made 
possible by modern medical science—actually reaches this population. 
The general living conditions of a population group and the extent 
to which it actually receives the benefits of medicine and hygiene 
technically possible are, of course, not entirely separate affairs. Both 
are highly dependent upon the economic conditions of the population 
group in question. Housing, clothing, nutrition, fresh water supply, 
drainage, but also medical attention medicine, special forms of treat-
ment, nursing assistance—all cost money. 
Two observations must be made here, however. In the first place 
it should be pointed out that in this case it is not only the average 
national income per head of population that is important, but also the 
way in which this is distributed among the various social strata and the 
effect of any modifications in this respect introduced by government 
measures. Particularly important in this respect is the extent to which 
the government promotes direct health care and creates living con-
ditions conducive to good health, whether this is done by a system of 
insurance or by means of direct treasury grants. 
In the second place it may be said that in respect of health care the 
law of diminishing returns apparently applies with great force. Recent 
years have shown that in so-called underdeveloped countries with 
very high mortality rates the latter can be brought down to a reason-
able level in a few years' time—given correct policy on the part of the 
government and the support of international organizations—by means 
of large-scale measures in the field of hygiene, vaccination, supply of 
drugs, etc. If, however, attempts are made to reduce mortality still 
more, to the level achieved in what are in this respect the most ad-
vanced western countries, these attempts will most likely fail unless 
considerably higher investments are made in medicine and hygiene, 
and much greater outlays in men and material for health care in 
general, while at the same time a considerable improvement in the 
population's general living conditions will also prove essential. To 
give a concrete example, the step from the situation as it still is in 
India at present to the situation in Ceylon, where mortality rates have 
been reduced in a short space of time, is presumably easier to ac-
complish than the step from the present situation in Ceylon to the 
rates characteristic of the Netherlands today. 
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Undoubtedly the increasing prosperity in the Netherlands during 
recent decades has also been of considerable significance in reducing 
the death rate. The differences between the various economic classes 
as regards the level of mortality are tending to diminish, and we may 
definitely associate this with the general increase in prosperity. An-
other important factor is certainly the steadily increasing governmental 
activity in the direct promotion of national health, one of the measures 
taken being to make membership of a sickness insurance fund com-
pulsory. 
Partly because of the lack of sufficient data, it is difficult—certainly 
for the layman in medical matters—to decide whether a country like 
the Netherlands could reduce its mortality rate very much more by 
means of greater expenditure on direct health care and an improve-
ment in the general living conditions of the population, leaving out 
of consideration for the moment the differences which new discoveries 
in medicine might make. One gains the impression, however, that this 
is hardly likely. Certainly a higher national income is, in itself, no 
guarantee of success, since western countries with a higher national 
income per head of population than the Netherlands do not, up to 
now, display a higher average expectation of life. In fact their figures 
are sometimes quite a bit lower. But suppose the national income 
were differently allocated so that a larger part of it were devoted to 
direct health care and the improvement of living conditions adversely 
affecting the general health situation: would this have an important 
effect? Something is achieved by every improvement, of course, but 
there is hardly any doubt that, in the Netherlands, the time of easy 
victory over death is past. Between the last normal pre-war year and 
1950 (the time at which it is generally accepted that the war had 
largely ceased to exert any direct influence) the standardized mortality 
rate dropped from 100 to 78, i.e. by 22 points, this notwithstanding 
the negative influence of the war itself, whereas in the year following, 
up to and including 1959, it only dropped another 8 points, i.e. to 70. 
After some stagnation in the difficult period during and after the war, 
it is precisely those years subsequent to 1950 that are characterized by 
relatively high investment in the medical sector (hospitals, nursing 
homes etc.) yet this is reflected only very slightly, if at all, in the 
mortality rate. Apparently the effect of a number of medical dis-
coveries, including antibiotics, in the earlier period was considerably 
greater than that of the growing prosperity and larger investments in 
the field of medicine and hygiene after 1950. 
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But if expansion of medical care and improvement of the general 
living conditions -would not bring about any significant reduction in 
mortality, the implication is that in the Netherlands as a whole mor-
tality is already practically at a minimum so that—apart from differ-
ences in age structure, of course—it should be approximately the same 
all over the Netherlands. And how can this be reconciled with the 
fact, mentioned earlier, that the standardized mortality rate in Lim-
burg is about 20% higher than in the northern provinces? In general, 
the regional differences in mortality still seem to be considerable. If 
we take smaller and therefore more homogenous units than the 
provinces, these differences are even more conspicuous. Using the 
Yule method, the Central Bureau of Statistics has calculated the 
standardized mortality rates for persons above 1 year of age, during 
the years 1951-1955, for a number of groups of rural municipalities 
in the Netherlands x). For the northern pastoral region in Overyssel, 
this gives a standardized mortality rate (according to this method) of 
11.5, but for the eastern part of the district called the Meyery in North 
Brabant one of 16.3, i.e. no less than 42% higher. There appear to be 
differences in infant mortality, too, between the various regions. Talcing 
each province as a whole, in the year 1959 mortality within the first 12 
months of life varied between 14.5 per 1,000 live births in Zeeland 
and 20.1 in Limburg. Average infant mortality was also calculated for 
parts of provinces, as in the case of the standardized mortality rates 
mentioned previously and for the same period, viz. 1951-1955. The 
figures for these areas varied between 12.8 for the northeastern arable 
farming district in Groningen to 30.7 for the Land of Cuyck in North 
Brabant. Now the element of chance cannot be ruled out where such 
comparatively small areas are concerned, even when 5-yearly averages 
are employed, but if we study the location of the areas with high infant 
mortality and high standardized mortality on the one hand, and of those 
with low mortality osx the other, then, as I have demonstrated else-
where 2), a certain regularity is apparent. In general, the areas with 
unfavourable ratios appear to be concentrated in the east and south 
of the country, particularly in eastern Brabant and northern Limburg. 
That it was not just chance that the groups of municipalities selected 
by the C.B.S. should include places where the highest standardized 
J) E. W. HOFSTEB, 'Rural Life and Rural Welfare in the Netherlands', p. 181. 
2) E. W. HOFSTEB, 'Regionale sterfte-verschillen' (Regional Differences in 
Mortality), Ttjdschrift voor Sociale Geneeskunds (Journal of Social Medicine) Vol. 36, 
1958, pp. 499-511. 
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mortality rates and the highest infant mortality were recorded in this 
part of the country in 1951-1955, is confirmed by the relatively high 
infant mortality rates which were also characteristic of these districts 
in later years. The crude death rates, as is already obvious from table 
8, convey little, under present circumstances, about the real situation 
as regards mortality. Mortality has decreased so much everywhere and 
the variation in it likewise, that the differences in age structure are now 
of paramount influence in the regional differences between the crude 
death rates. If, however, recent standardized statistics per municipality 
were available, these would presumably still indicate a somewhat 
higher level in the east of North Brabant and the north of Limburg 
and perhaps also for a few other areas in the east and south, although 
the differences are tending to diminish quite rapidly. 
It will be immediately obvious that the area where mortality rates 
distinctly above the average have apparently maintained themselves 
longest is also the area where the birth rates have remained high for a 
longer period. We have already pointed out that no direct connection 
can be proved between the fertility decline and the mortality decline, 
but one may perhaps be inclined to think the other way round and 
wonder whether the high infant mortality in the south in particular 
cannot be accounted for by the high level of the birth rate. We possess 
no published data concerning infant mortality in relation to the number 
of children that the mother has borne, but the data capable of supply-
ing some indirect clues give no indication of a close connection be-
tween the two. The province of Friesland, for example, which (as 
already mentioned) has been characterized in recent years by a marital 
fertility no longer very different from that of Limburg, continued to 
record a relatively low rate for infant mortality, whereas the figure for 
Limburg was relatively high. Moreover, this could not help to explain 
the higher mortality also found among the older age groups in the 
area concerned. 
From the observations made when discussing the fertility trend it 
may be inferred that, in my opinion, another explanation must be 
sought. I tried to provide an acceptable explanation a few years ago, 
in a paper on regional differences in mortality 1). Since my views on 
the subject have not changed in the meantime, rather the reverse in 
fact, may I begin by referring readers to the publication in question, 
including the cartograph published at the same time, and let a brief 
summary suffice here. 
*) HOFSTEE, 'Regionale stetfte-verschillen'. 
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Let me first recall that when dealing with fertility, passing reference 
was made to the fact that, from a regional point of view, since the 
middle of the last century the trend of mortality has been strongly 
reminiscent of the fertility trend. Around 1850, crude death rates in 
the west of the Netherlands were considerably higher than in the rest 
of the country. North Holland, South Holland, Zeeland and the west 
of Utrecht showed exceptionally high rates, rising to about 40 in some 
areas. The rates were also somewhat higher in the clay districts of 
Friesland and Groningen than they were in the sandy districts of these 
provinces or in the sandy soil regions in general. In the period 1871-
1875, some improvement could be detected here and there in the west, 
compared with the situation in the period 1851-1855. This was es-
pecially the case in Zeeland, In the east and south, however, there was 
still no question of any improvement. In the final quarter of the last 
century a very great change occurs and all the ratios are completely 
altered. In the west, and in the north too, mortality rates decline extra-
ordinarily rapidly (see map 7), while in the east and south the decline 
is still relatively slight. Around the turn of the century, the north and 
west generally are characterized by relatively low mortality, whereas 
in the east and south and particularly in the east of North Brabant, 
relatively high death rates still frequently occur. During the next 50 
years death rates all over the country continue to fall, while the differ-
ences between the various parts of the country keep diminishing. As 
already pointed out, the differences gradually become so slight that the 
crude death rate virtually loses all force as an indication of the expec- , 
tation of life. Only the infant mortality rate and the standardized death 
rate show that until a short time ago some pockets of relatively high 
mortality were still to be found in various parts of the east and south, 
although one gains the impression that during the last few years the 
province of North Brabant in particular has been rapidly overcoming 
its remaining disadvantage in this respect. 
In an article published in 1951, D E VOOYS X) attempts to account for 
the high death rate in the west of the country in the middle of the last 
century. His suggestions include the bad economic and social con-
ditions in the old Dutch towns, the inadequate diet in both urban and 
rural districts, the poor quality of the drinking water, and the high 
birth rate in the west. Because of the level of infant mortality at the 
x) A. C. DE VOOYS, 'De sterfte in Nederland in het midden van de 19de eeuw' 
(Mortality in the Netherlands in the mid-19th century), Tydschrift Kon. Aardrijks-
kundig Genootschap (Journal Royal Geographical Society), 1951, pp. 234-271. 
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Source: Agricultural University. Wagenlngen. Department of Rural 
Sociology 
Map 7 
Comparison of the average number of deaths per 1,000 of the total population in 
Dutch municipalities, 1861-1865 and 1886-1890. 
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time, the high birth rates had a considerable eSect, in a negative sense, 
upon total mortality as a whole. D E VOOYS also stresses the importance 
of malaria in the alluvial districts. 
As I contended in the aforesaid article on regional differences in 
mortality, the circumstances indicated by D E VOOYS illustrate why 
death rates in the west were so high but can only provide a partial ex-
planation for the noticeably sharp decline after 1870 both here and in 
the north in comparison with the rest of the country. This applies par-
ticularly to the country districts. Rural drinking water continued to 
be bad for decades. It was precisely in the last quarter of the 19th 
century that the great agricultural crisis led to particularly unfavour-
able social-economic developments in the rural areas, which amongst 
other things naturally precluded any improvement in nutrition. To be 
sure, other things being equal—the birth rate decline in the west must 
have led to some decline in the death rate, but this only accounts to a 
very limited extent for the greatly improved situation with regard to 
mortality, compared with the rest of the country. As for the towns, it 
should be pointed out that their socio-economic position certainly 
improved after 1870 and in other respects, too, their situation became 
mote favourable, but nowhere in the west were the urban munici-
palities in the van of the mortality decline. As late as 1890, the towns 
in the west are still clearly at a disadvantage compared with the pe-
ninsula of North Holland and with Zeeland; it is only around the 
turn of the century that they gradually begin to draw a little ahead of 
the rural districts in the same area. 
In the second half of the 19th century mortality declined in the north 
as well as in the west far more than in the rest of the country. But no 
change could be observed in living conditions in either the west or 
the north which could help to account for this relatively favourable 
situation. Once more the decline occurred at a time when prosperity, 
particularly in rural districts, was threatened by the great agricultural 
crisis. 
How, then, can this trend be explained? The general background 
to the decline must undoubtedly be sought in the expansion of know-
ledge and insight in the fields of medicine and hygiene. In 1850 we were 
still at the pre-modern stage in this respect. Scientific discoveries, how-
ever, laid the foundations for developments in the second half of the 
19th century which made it technically possible to overcome the disad-
vantages of a geographical nature in the west as well as those of popu-
lation agglomeration in the towns, for example. But this still cannot 
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explain the change from a 'debit' to a 'credit' situation in the west, and 
our question, therefore, remains unanswered. 
As we have pointed out before, the mortality trend is dependent 
not only on the standard of medical science and the general living 
conditions of the population, but also on the degree to which medical 
care and hygiene compatible with that standard reach the population. 
The dissemination of adequate medical care and hygiene is dependent 
not only on the general economic situation and all sorts of organi-
zational measures, but also on the degree to which the population is 
prepared to accept these benefits in the form in which they are pre-
sented. 
This observation is in itself of course, not new. Everyone knows 
those stories about the opposition raised to the introduction of re-
sponsible medical care for invants, particularly by grandmothers and 
aunts. Many infants still die each year who could have survived if they 
had received correct treatment. It is an equally well known fact that 
many people tend, at least in the first instance, to rely on all sorts of 
traditional cures and treatments and on family remedies. Another very 
important point is that, because of adherence to traditional customs 
and habits, incorrect diet affects health conditions adversely to a far 
greater extent than if proper use were made of the material resources 
available. 
In my opinion, however, too little attention has been paid to the 
fact that inadequate response to the opportunities offered by modern 
health care is not due just to fortuity or stupidity but is connected 
with individual and group culture. The mortality trend is largely a 
cultural phenomenon. In view of this, the conclusion is obvious. To 
a significant extent, the mortality decline in the Netherlands is con-
nected with historical developments in the spread of the modern-
dynamic pattern of culture throughout the country. The movement 
of falling death rates, roughly from north-west to southeast, now be-
comes comprehensible. Let this conclusion suffice here; for a more 
detailed line of argument, readers are referred to the article mentioned 
previously. 
While, therefore, the influence of the development of the modern 
pattern of culture appears to be an important factor in both the mor-
tality decline and fertility trends, it is only to be expected that, in vari-
ous respects, it should manifest itself differently in each case. We may 
assume that, in general, traditional patterns of nuptiality and repro-
duction are not discarded before an actual change has taken place in 
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the pattern of culture as a whole, but the progress of medical science 
may already be exerting considerable influence before much change 
occurs in the mental attitude of the population. This is particularly 
true in modern times, now that collective measures are used to see 
that the achievements of medical science are, if not compulsorily im-
posed, at least strongly urged upon the population. In modern countries 
today, compulsory, or widely publicized inoculations, compulsory 
medical examinations for all sorts of purposes, considerable insistence 
on collective fluoroscopy, statutory inspection of foodstuffs, constant 
attention to drinking water, detection and isolation of sources of in-
fection in cases of infectious disease; all this and more protects the 
lives of the inhabitants, including those who, in their mental attitudes, 
may still be complete strangers to modern medical care and hygiene. 
But during the last century too, at a time when governments were less 
advanced in this respect—although even then the 'public health au-
thorities' were part of their responsibility in western countries—be-
cause of the innate fear of death, modern medical science was already 
influencing population groups which were essentially still immature. 
When people were really dangerously ill, they called the doctor, even 
though they possibly regarded him more as a magician than as the 
servant of modern science. The difference with the present lay prima-
rily in the day-to-day attitude towards hygiene, nutrition, etc., and in 
the manner of treating less acute complaints and less serious illnesses. 
Thus around 1890 generally, a distinct decline in mortality may al-
ready be observed in the east and south of the country, but the process 
proceeds more slowly there than in the west and north. It is only around 
the turn of the century that it really gains momentum and that the 
disadvantages of these areas compared with the north and west are 
gradually eliminated. 
The varying reactions of the trends of fertility and mortality to the 
nature of the pattern of culture is one of the main reasons why the 
parallelism between the regional trends of the mortality decline and the 
fertility decline is only relative. In the west—especially in the peninsula 
of North Holland and Zeeland—and in the northern provinces, where 
the change in the pattern of culture had already set in at an early date, 
fertility decline and mortality decline developed more or less simul-
taneously, although the mortality decline, in general, presumably be-
gan a little earlier and proceeded more rapidly. In the east and south of 
the country, a certain decline in the mortality rate was already apparent 
when the modern pattern of culture had barely developed there among 
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the mass of the population and when there was still no question in 
these parts of a decline in fertility. As remarked earlier, in some areas 
—especially in North Brabant—a decline in mortality was already ascer-
tainable while the fertility increase was actually still in active progress. 
But if both fertility and mortality statistics are dependent to a signifi-
cant extent upon the development of the modern pattern of culture, 
how can we account for the fact that in past years the Netherlands has 
had a relatively high birth rate and a relatively low death rate compared 
with other countries? My earlier observation about the differing effect 
of this development on births on the one hand and deaths on the other 
really also implies that complete parallelism of the trends of fertility 
and mortality cannot be expected for the country as a whole any more 
than for the various regions. Added to that—as is also quite apparent 
from the foregoing, in spite of the emphasis placed on the development 
of the modern pattern of culture—neither the fertility trend nor that of 
mortality depends exclusively upon the penetration of the culture pat-
tern. In general, factors of a different nature have helped to promote a 
relatively low death rate and a relatively high birth rate. 
As regards mortality, it should be remembered that, as PETERSEN 
has already pointed out, organized health care in the Netherlands at-
tained a high standard at an early date x); as regards fertility, reference 
has already been made to the effect produced by the relatively slight 
proletarianization of the working class in the 19th century, and to the 
influence of the isolation of the former States General territories,which 
considerably retarded the birth rate decline in the southeast of the 
Netherlands. 
The gradual dissemination of the modern-dynamic pattern of culture 
throughout the whole country and all strata of the population has 
reduced still further the former differences in both the fertility and the 
mortality trends. The earlier data, however, have already made it clear 
that substantial differences still remain. Since other factors (attitudes to 
life, for example) have less effect upon mortality than upon fertility, 
the degree to which in the near future the last traces of the traditional 
pattern of culture are retained will presumably affect regional differ-
ences in mortality relatively more than regional differences in fertility. 
This raises the question of the extent to which the trend can be 
favourably influenced by health education. Were it possible, for ex-
ample, to reduce mortality in the Netherlands as a whole to the level 
l) Planned Migration. 
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obtaining in Zeeland, this would mean (on the basis of the ratios in 
1955-1956) a mortality decline for the country as a whole of 10%. The 
origin of the nation's 'surplus' mortality compared with that of Zee-
land presumably does not lie—or only to a very limited extent—in 
general living conditions or in biological causes, but mostly in the 
degree to which modern medical care and hygiene are accepted by the 
population. 
Such education will certainly have to be focussed largely on matters 
connected with medicine, hygiene and other closely related subjects. 
Further systematic research will be needed to determine the most im-
portant, concrete and promising starting points for health education. 
It can hardly be doubted that such starting points exist. The data at 
our disposal make it evident that the health of the population could 
certainly be improved still more by encouraging better diet habits. It 
is noteworthy, and quite in accordance with what was maintained 
earlier, that according to the data available rural diet habits in the east 
and south of the Netherlands are more conservative and less in keeping 
with modern theories than in the west1). It is also significant that there 
are still considerable regional differences in the extent to which medical 
assistance is requested in the treatment of illness and disease. For the 
less serious illnessess, for example, country dwellers in general seem 
much less inclined to call the doctor than townsmen 2). 
It is questionable, however, whether information that is strictly 
confined to the fields of medicine and hygiene will suffice. As has been 
said, the essential background to the population's attitude towards 
problems of medicine and hygiene lies in the total pattern of culture. 
Effective education, therefore, would have to aim at stimulating the 
adjustment of the culture pattern of the groups concerned to circum-
stances and trends in our presentday society, although, of course, any 
such education should always have concrete problems as a starting 
point. Another point in favour of educational activities on a wide basis 
is that these would simultaneously lay the foundations for a change in 
such other aspects of the population's behaviour as are also affected 
by the nature of the pattern of culture. Research has clearly demon-
strated, for example, that the population's attitude towards formal 
education, the interest taken in social life and public affairs generally, 
x) For a summary of the results of the research in question, see Hofstee, 'Rural 
Life ... e tc ' pp. 221-229. 
8) HOFSTEE, 'Rural Life and Rural Welfare ... etc.', chapter on Health and the 
material mentioned in it. 
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the nature of economic behaviour, and many other behavioural charac-
teristics of the individual and the group, are bound up with the extent 
of the development of the modern pattern of culture1). Education 
aimed at changing the mentality and behaviour of the population in 
general but paying due attention to medicine and hygiene, -would 
presumably yield the best results. 
In this connection, the question may also be raised of the extent to 
which the well-known fact that mortality depends on the social po-
sition of those concerned should be explained—as usually happens— 
exclusively on the basis of the general living conditions associated 
with their social-economic status. It cannot be denied that, in this 
respect, material living conditions have indeed been of significance, 
perhaps even of very great significance in the past. It is very probable, 
however, that the fact that, in our society, development of the modern 
pattern of culture started in the higher social strata and only gradually 
penetrated to the lower classes, has also had an effect. No concrete 
results of research in this field are available in the Netherlands, so that 
for the time being the question must remain academic. 
The foregoing leads to the conclusion that—the advances of medical 
science apart—in the future some further decline in the mortality, i.e. 
an increase in the average expectation of life, may yet be anticipated 
in the Netherlands. Unless revolutionary discoveries are made in 
medicine, especially in the treatment of heart disease and cancer, this 
decline will presumably be slow. That is indicated by the relatively 
slight fall in the standardized mortality rate in recent years. As regards 
the crude death rate, it is hardly to be expected that this will remain at 
its present level much longer: it has stood at about 7.5 for a good many 
years already. The high birtfi rates just after the war were responsible 
for a considerable rejuvenation of the Dutch population but, as this 
effect gradually passes and the gradual decline in the birth rate which 
has been recorded in recent years continues, an increase in the death 
rate must almost inevitably follow. 
For the time being, however, the Netherlands is still in quite a 
favourable position compared with the surrounding western countries. 
This fact, combined with a birth rate which is likely to stay fairly high 
for some time yet, makes it practically certain that, for quite a while, 
the Netherlands will continue to be characterized by a population 
growth that is relatively rapid for the western countries. This implies 
x) Various publications of the Dept. of Sociology and Sociography of the 
Agricultural University. 
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that the problem of the effect of population growth on social trends 
in the Netherlands is still extraordinarily important and interesting. 
4. THE EFFECT OF POPULATION INCREASE 
The problem of the effect of population trends on social life in the 
widest sense of the term has occupied the attention of students of the 
social sciences ever since the excess of births over deaths assumed such 
proportions that people became clearly aware of the phenomenon of 
population increase. At the present time it is once more the centre of 
attention because of the rapid expansion of population in the under-
developed countries. 
Since the days of MALTHUS, it has been the economists who have 
concentrated most on this problem, and their conclusions have been 
alternately optimistic and pessimistic. It is rather regrettable to be 
obliged to observe that, after nearly two centuries of argument, they 
apparently still cannot reach agreement, a point which recent dis-
cussions in the Netherlands serve to illustrate1). Nevertheless, pro-
ceeding from 'pure' economic considerations, we may draw some 
conclusions that are hard to refute as to the way in which relatively 
rapid population increase affects a nation's prosperity. But there is 
some difficulty about arriving at a working definition of the concept 
'prosperity'. The question is whether we should take the national 
income per head of population without further qualification, or that 
part of the national income left for consumption after such investment 
as guarantees a given increase in the quantity of capital goods per 
head of the working population has been made. 
The latter seems to me the more appropriate in this connection but 
opinions on this may vary. 
Where there is a rapidly expanding population: 
1. in general, the percentage of persons in active employment will 
be relatively low, since there will be a relatively high proportion of 
*) See the publications by D E ROOS and PEN mentioned in note 11. Also 
J. TINBERGEN'S paper for the Nederlands Instituut van Accountants (Dutch Inst. 
of Accountants) 14.10.60, entitled Nederland's relatieve whaartspositie, vroeger en nu 
(The relative prosperity of the Netherlands, in the past and today). According to 
this stencilled thesis Prof. TINBERGEN expressed the opinion that the sharp rise in 
population has had a negative effect on the growth of prosperity, but that this 
effect has been offset by relatively high savings. 
120 E. W. HOFSTEE 
persons in the young economically dependent group, a circumstance 
for which the relatively small economically dependent group of old 
people 'cannot fully compensate. Because of this—other things being 
equal—the national income per head of population will be relatively 
low; 
2. because of the rapid increase in the number of economically 
active persons—other things being equal—a given expansion of the 
quantity of capital goods per head of population will absorb a larger 
share of the national income, which means that less is available for 
consumption; 
3. in a country like the Netherlands where the economy is heavily 
dependent upon imports and therefore also on exports, assuming a 
given level of national income per head of population, exports must 
increase relatively rapidly, a circumstance which, generally speaking, 
will evoke more opposition in the importing countries than would a 
gradual increase. 
4. there will be more chance of a fairly ample labour supply, 
resulting, on the one hand, in a relatively high percentage of regis-
tered and latent unemployment and, on the other, in depression of the 
wage level. In consequence of the latter, there is less tendency—other 
things being equal—to reduce the amount of labour per unit produced 
by means of mechanization and rationalization. Labour productivity 
and, accordingly, the national per capita income may remain lower 
because of this and moreover investment per head of population will 
probably also be less. 
5. other things being equal, in consequence of the necessarily rapid 
expansion of the production of capital goods, on an average these 
goods will be comparatively new and therefore up-to-date and service-
able, wich will help to promote productivity. It should be pointed out 
here, however, that the average age of capital goods is not determined 
solely by the rate of expansion of their production but also by the 
degree to which replacements are made. 
6. in consequence of the increasingly greater density of the popu-
lation, transportation, in the very widest sense of the word, becomes 
on an average cheaper. This includes the carriage of persons and 
goods, the conveyance of electricity, gas, etc., via cables and pipes, 
and communications. The reason is that the mean distance to be 
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covered is reduced and the ways and means of transportation are used 
to greater capacity. The latter, of course, is only an advantage as long 
as it is not yet optimal; 
7. the domestic market increases in volume, therefore giving more 
opportunity for taking advantage of large production units and for 
specialization. This promotes higher labour productivity; 
8. partly as a result of what was mentioned under point 3—there is 
more chance that natural resources of inferior quality will be exploited, 
involving a reduction in labour productivity in primary production. 
It should be pointed out here that the quality of resources depends 
only slightly on their native character but very largely on the level of 
technical know-how. Relatively heavy clay soil, which was highly 
esteemed last century for its natural fertility, is now worth less, from 
an agricultural point of view, than lighter, more sandy clay-soils. 
The above list could possibly be expanded somewhat, but it seems 
to me that it already reflects the main advantages and disadvantages 
which—reasoning along purely economic lines—might be expected 
from a relatively rapid rise in population. The importance of these 
factors is more than just theoretical. Without going into any more 
detail, I think it can be established that some have clearly had a favour-
able effect on Dutch prosperity, others unfavourable. Considering all 
things, one is inclined to conclude that the unfavourable factors carry 
more weight than the favourable ones. This also appears to be the 
impression of the majority of economists, although it is difficult not 
to feel that the final conclusions of some of these gentlemen are not 
entirely divorced from their personal philosophies. The more or less 
unbridled optimism displayed by D E ROOS1) seems hard to justify. 
It should be added at once, however, that the operation of the 
factors referred to above depends to an appreciable extent upon the 
nature of circumstances. It is clear for example that the operation of 
unfavourable factors is felt much less during a boom than during a 
slump. 
In the foregoing, however, as was emphasized at the time, a line of 
'pure' economic argument was followed, whereby man's individual 
or group attitude to the economic process was regarded as a datum 
completely independent of population increase. It is very doubtful 
l) DE ROOS, Bevolking en Wehaart (Population and Prosperity). 
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•whether there can be any such independence. It may almost be as-
sumed a priori that this cannot be the case. It is practically incon-
ceivable that a nation, or part of a nation, which is growing slowly 
should, under otherwise identical circumstances, demonstrate the 
same mental attitudes and behaviour as a rapidly-growing group. If 
the rate of population increase is of influence in this respect, there is a 
strong probability that the economic behaviour of the group in 
question and of its individual members will also be affected. As far as 
I know, hardly any concrete research has been carried out on this 
problem up to now. Research done by the Department of Sociology 
and Sociography of the Agricultural University, however, tends to 
indicate some connection between the nature of population increase 
and economic conduct. 
Research carried out by WICHERS1) in two villages in the Betuwe 
district, one of which was predominantly Roman Catholic with rela-
tively large families, and the other Protestant with relatively small 
ones, revealed notable differences in economic behaviour although 
there were no apparent differences in the general conditions under 
which agriculture was carried on in the two villages. The heads of 
undertakings in the Catholic village generally displayed far more 
tendency to conduct their business along modern, practical lines than 
did those in the Protestant village. Research on market-gardening in 
the glass-culture district of South Holland gave rise to the impression 
—although this problem had not been the primary objective of the 
study in question—that there, too, the undertakings managed by 
Catholic market-gardeners were progressing more favourably than 
those of the non-Catholics2). 
Although we must naturally be cautious in interpreting the results 
of this research, it seems an obvious assumption that, in both cases, 
the larger family acted, as a spur to extra effort in the economic field. 
But it should be realized that a relatively sharp increase in population 
will not operate under all circumstances in the same way. In a purely 
traditional sphere, such as was to be found during the last century in 
the farming districts of North Brabant for example, a large family 
*) A. J. WICHERS, De evalmtie van een voorlichiingscampagne in de Betuwe (Evaluation 
of an extension campaign in the Betuwe district), Bulletin no. 11, Dept. of Soci-
ology and Sociography of the Agricultural University 1958. 
2) U. GELING, De tuinbouwestiging sinds 1945 op nieuwe gronden in bet Westland en 
de Kring (Horticultural settlement since 1945 on new ground in the Westland and 
Kring district), 1961 (unpublished). 
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could only mean, at most, that the productivity of the family unit 
would be augmented somewhat because of the larger number of 
labourers available. It does not seem very likely that, in those days, it 
could have resulted in a stronger tendency to take advantage of new 
opportunities and methods. Under present conditions in the Nether-
lands however, it seems not improbable that a large family may 
provide an inducement for the better exploitation of the available 
economic potential, but more research will be needed before the 
findings of the investigations just mentioned can be confirmed. 
But while a review of the economic effects of rapid, population 
increase leaves many questions still unanswered, once we leave this 
field and ask ourselves how the relative extent of population increase 
affects other sectors of social life, we can only conclude that we know 
even less about this. Much has been written about the way demo-
graphic developments affect social life, but there is very little that we 
can actually go on. As far as I know, hardly any exact, systematic 
comparisons have been made between population groups which are 
similar in kind yet obviously different in their rate of population in-
crease. We have no notion, for example, how the considerable differ-
ence in rate of population increase in Belgium on the one hand and in 
the Netherlands on the other is reflected in differences in the social life 
of these two countries. Presumably there are such differences and 
probably they are important, but we have no reliable conception of 
them. 
What is the effect in the Netherlands of the increasing density of 
population? How are people responding to it? Does it affect the social 
structure? Is it leading to any change in existing institutions? Does it 
give rise to social tension? Are adjustments called for that are difficult 
to make? Does it lead to closer social relationships or, possibly just 
the reverse, to social isolation? These are all questions which we can 
perhaps try to answer provisionally by assumptions founded on 
personal experience, but we still lack a proper basis for an answer. 
Does the rapid population increase, generally speaking, tend to stimu-
late social life in the Netherlands, as we assumed was the case with 
economic life, or does it rather impede the development of all sorts of 
activities? It would not be hard to find apparently logical arguments 
in support of either assumption, but this would still leave us flounder-
ing in the sphere of hypothesis. 
The rapidly increasing density of the population naturally has social 
consequences, but what are they? In the main, the only pronounce-
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ments we can make about this with any degree of certainty are all on 
the technical-social plane. We know that the pattern of settlement 
must change where there is a rapidly increasing population, but how 
does this affect the population itself? The efforts made up to now to 
arrive at a fairly reliable assessment of how housing and type of settle-
ment affects the welfare and social behaviour of the population have 
largely failed. 
In the Netherlands a policy in physical planning is pursued which is 
aimed at avoiding further population agglomeration in the west of the 
country, yet the only motives we advance to justify it are either techni-
cal (traffic problems, for instance) or economic (providing work for 
those affected by structural unemployment in the problem areas, 
avoiding the mounting costs of public bodies as a result of increasing 
concentration, etc.). The planning authorities hope and trust that this 
policy will also benefit people in many other ways, but nobody really 
knows if this is so. Even outdoor recreation, which is so frequently 
emphasized in connection with the consequences of excessive density 
and concentration of population, remains an unknown quantity in 
this respect. As far as this type of recreation is concerned, are most 
people really trying to find more elbowroom, or are they just seeking 
the close proximity of others all over again but in a different guise? 
Research has not been able to give a clear answer, so far. 
It is remarkable that as regards complaints about structural and 
functional imperfections in social life and the welfare deficiencies 
connected with density of population, the one that is currently most 
clearly defined in the Netherlands, and most firmly founded on es-
tablished fact, has its origins in phenomena relating not to over-
population but to under-population. This complaint comes from the 
purely—or predominantly—agrarian districts in the north and south-
west of the country, where the size of the population is or is becoming 
inadequate for organizing and maintaining an apparatus for the eco-
nomic, social and cultural well-being of the population that is in 
keeping with the standards of the times, at any rate as long as the 
present pattern of settlement persists. Problems of this nature are also 
encountered in the Yssel Lake polders1). 
The foregoing, of course, is certainly not meant to imply that the 
relatively rapid population increase in the Netherlands is failing to 
x) A. K. CONSTANDSE, HetDorp in dt IJsselmeerpolders (Villages in the Yssel Lake 
Polders), 1961. 
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give rise to any serious problems and that its effect upon social life in 
general is slight. On the contrary, I am still convinced that it is ex-
ceedingly great. But I am just as convinced that we still know very 
little about the real effect of this phenomenon, and that research in this 
field must be regarded as a matter of the first importance. 
